bpo-40932: Note security caveat of shlex.quote on Windows (GH-21502)
Added a note in the `subprocess` docs that recommend using `shlex.quote` without mentioning that this is only applicable to Unix. Also added a warning straight into the `shlex` docs since it only says "for simple syntaxes resembling that of the Unix shell" and says using `quote` plugs the security hole without mentioning this important caveat.
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@ -61,6 +61,20 @@ The :mod:`shlex` module defines the following functions:
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string that can safely be used as one token in a shell command line, for
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cases where you cannot use a list.
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.. _shlex-quote-warning:
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.. warning::
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The ``shlex`` module is **only designed for Unix shells**.
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The :func:`quote` function is not guaranteed to be correct on non-POSIX
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compliant shells or shells from other operating systems such as Windows.
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Executing commands quoted by this module on such shells can open up the
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possibility of a command injection vulnerability.
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Consider using functions that pass command arguments with lists such as
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:func:`subprocess.run` with ``shell=False``.
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This idiom would be unsafe:
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>>> filename = 'somefile; rm -rf ~'
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@ -718,11 +718,8 @@ If the shell is invoked explicitly, via ``shell=True``, it is the application's
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responsibility to ensure that all whitespace and metacharacters are
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quoted appropriately to avoid
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`shell injection <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shell_injection#Shell_injection>`_
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vulnerabilities.
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When using ``shell=True``, the :func:`shlex.quote` function can be
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used to properly escape whitespace and shell metacharacters in strings
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that are going to be used to construct shell commands.
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vulnerabilities. On :ref:`some platforms <shlex-quote-warning>`, it is possible
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to use :func:`shlex.quote` for this escaping.
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Popen Objects
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