#5871: protect against header injection attacks.
This makes Header.encode throw a HeaderParseError if it winds up formatting a header such that a continuation line has no leading whitespace and looks like a header. Since Header accepts values containing newlines and preserves them (and this is by design), without this fix any program that took user input (say, a subject in a web form) and passed it to the email package as a header was vulnerable to header injection attacks. (As far as we know this has never been exploited.) Thanks to Jakub Wilk for reporting this vulnerability.
This commit is contained in:
parent
e3ee66f141
commit
5b2d9ddf69
|
@ -47,6 +47,10 @@ ecre = re.compile(r'''
|
|||
# For use with .match()
|
||||
fcre = re.compile(r'[\041-\176]+:$')
|
||||
|
||||
# Find a header embeded in a putative header value. Used to check for
|
||||
# header injection attack.
|
||||
_embeded_header = re.compile(r'\n[^ \t]+:')
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Helpers
|
||||
|
@ -320,7 +324,11 @@ class Header:
|
|||
if len(lines) > 1:
|
||||
formatter.newline()
|
||||
formatter.add_transition()
|
||||
return formatter._str(linesep)
|
||||
value = formatter._str(linesep)
|
||||
if _embeded_header.search(value):
|
||||
raise HeaderParseError("header value appears to contain "
|
||||
"an embedded header: {!r}".format(value))
|
||||
return value
|
||||
|
||||
def _normalize(self):
|
||||
# Step 1: Normalize the chunks so that all runs of identical charsets
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -561,6 +561,18 @@ class TestMessageAPI(TestEmailBase):
|
|||
"attachment; filename*=utf-8''Fu%C3%9Fballer%20%5Bfilename%5D.ppt",
|
||||
msg['Content-Disposition'])
|
||||
|
||||
# Issue 5871: reject an attempt to embed a header inside a header value
|
||||
# (header injection attack).
|
||||
def test_embeded_header_via_Header_rejected(self):
|
||||
msg = Message()
|
||||
msg['Dummy'] = Header('dummy\nX-Injected-Header: test')
|
||||
self.assertRaises(errors.HeaderParseError, msg.as_string)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_embeded_header_via_string_rejected(self):
|
||||
msg = Message()
|
||||
msg['Dummy'] = 'dummy\nX-Injected-Header: test'
|
||||
self.assertRaises(errors.HeaderParseError, msg.as_string)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Test the email.encoders module
|
||||
class TestEncoders(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -40,6 +40,13 @@ Core and Builtins
|
|||
Library
|
||||
-------
|
||||
|
||||
- Issue #5871: email.header.Header.encode now raises an error if any
|
||||
continuation line in the formatted value has no leading white space
|
||||
and looks like a header. Since Generator uses Header to format all
|
||||
headers, this check is made for all headers in any serialized message
|
||||
at serialization time. This provides protection against header
|
||||
injection attacks.
|
||||
|
||||
- Issue #10859: Make ``contextlib.GeneratorContextManager`` officially
|
||||
private by renaming it to ``_GeneratorContextManager``.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue