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Jetpack/kernel/kernel-4.9/security/commoncap.c

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/* Common capabilities, needed by capability.o.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
*/
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/mman.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/swap.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/netlink.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/prctl.h>
#include <linux/securebits.h>
#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_ANDROID_PARANOID_NETWORK
#include <linux/android_aid.h>
#endif
/*
* If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in
* !secure(SECURE_NOROOT) mode, then we raise capabilities.
* However if fE is also set, then the intent is for only
* the file capabilities to be applied, and the setuid-root
* bit is left on either to change the uid (plausible) or
* to get full privilege on a kernel without file capabilities
* support. So in that case we do not raise capabilities.
*
* Warn if that happens, once per boot.
*/
static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(const char *fname)
{
static int warned;
if (!warned) {
printk(KERN_INFO "warning: `%s' has both setuid-root and"
" effective capabilities. Therefore not raising all"
" capabilities.\n", fname);
warned = 1;
}
}
/**
* __cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
* @cred: The credentials to use
* @ns: The user namespace in which we need the capability
* @cap: The capability to check for
* @audit: Whether to write an audit message or not
*
* Determine whether the nominated task has the specified capability amongst
* its effective set, returning 0 if it does, -ve if it does not.
*
* NOTE WELL: cap_has_capability() cannot be used like the kernel's capable()
* and has_capability() functions. That is, it has the reverse semantics:
* cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the
* kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case.
*/
int __cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns,
int cap, int audit)
{
struct user_namespace *ns = targ_ns;
/* See if cred has the capability in the target user namespace
* by examining the target user namespace and all of the target
* user namespace's parents.
*/
for (;;) {
/* Do we have the necessary capabilities? */
if (ns == cred->user_ns)
return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM;
/* Have we tried all of the parent namespaces? */
if (ns == &init_user_ns)
return -EPERM;
/*
* The owner of the user namespace in the parent of the
* user namespace has all caps.
*/
if ((ns->parent == cred->user_ns) && uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid))
return 0;
/*
* If you have a capability in a parent user ns, then you have
* it over all children user namespaces as well.
*/
ns = ns->parent;
}
/* We never get here */
}
int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns,
int cap, int audit)
{
int ret = __cap_capable(cred, targ_ns, cap, audit);
#ifdef CONFIG_ANDROID_PARANOID_NETWORK
if (ret != 0 && cap == CAP_NET_RAW && in_egroup_p(AID_NET_RAW)) {
printk("Process %s granted CAP_NET_RAW from Android group net_raw.\n", current->comm);
printk(" Please update the .rc file to explictly set 'capabilities NET_RAW'\n");
printk(" Implicit grants are deprecated and will be removed in the future.\n");
return 0;
}
if (ret != 0 && cap == CAP_NET_ADMIN && in_egroup_p(AID_NET_ADMIN)) {
printk("Process %s granted CAP_NET_ADMIN from Android group net_admin.\n", current->comm);
printk(" Please update the .rc file to explictly set 'capabilities NET_ADMIN'\n");
printk(" Implicit grants are deprecated and will be removed in the future.\n");
return 0;
}
#endif
return ret;
}
/**
* cap_settime - Determine whether the current process may set the system clock
* @ts: The time to set
* @tz: The timezone to set
*
* Determine whether the current process may set the system clock and timezone
* information, returning 0 if permission granted, -ve if denied.
*/
int cap_settime(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz)
{
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TIME))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
/**
* cap_ptrace_access_check - Determine whether the current process may access
* another
* @child: The process to be accessed
* @mode: The mode of attachment.
*
* If we are in the same or an ancestor user_ns and have all the target
* task's capabilities, then ptrace access is allowed.
* If we have the ptrace capability to the target user_ns, then ptrace
* access is allowed.
* Else denied.
*
* Determine whether a process may access another, returning 0 if permission
* granted, -ve if denied.
*/
int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
{
int ret = 0;
const struct cred *cred, *child_cred;
const kernel_cap_t *caller_caps;
rcu_read_lock();
cred = current_cred();
child_cred = __task_cred(child);
if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS)
caller_caps = &cred->cap_effective;
else
caller_caps = &cred->cap_permitted;
if (cred->user_ns == child_cred->user_ns &&
cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, *caller_caps))
goto out;
if (ns_capable(child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
goto out;
ret = -EPERM;
out:
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
/**
* cap_ptrace_traceme - Determine whether another process may trace the current
* @parent: The task proposed to be the tracer
*
* If parent is in the same or an ancestor user_ns and has all current's
* capabilities, then ptrace access is allowed.
* If parent has the ptrace capability to current's user_ns, then ptrace
* access is allowed.
* Else denied.
*
* Determine whether the nominated task is permitted to trace the current
* process, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
*/
int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
{
int ret = 0;
const struct cred *cred, *child_cred;
rcu_read_lock();
cred = __task_cred(parent);
child_cred = current_cred();
if (cred->user_ns == child_cred->user_ns &&
cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted))
goto out;
if (has_ns_capability(parent, child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
goto out;
ret = -EPERM;
out:
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
/**
* cap_capget - Retrieve a task's capability sets
* @target: The task from which to retrieve the capability sets
* @effective: The place to record the effective set
* @inheritable: The place to record the inheritable set
* @permitted: The place to record the permitted set
*
* This function retrieves the capabilities of the nominated task and returns
* them to the caller.
*/
int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
const struct cred *cred;
/* Derived from kernel/capability.c:sys_capget. */
rcu_read_lock();
cred = __task_cred(target);
*effective = cred->cap_effective;
*inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable;
*permitted = cred->cap_permitted;
rcu_read_unlock();
return 0;
}
/*
* Determine whether the inheritable capabilities are limited to the old
* permitted set. Returns 1 if they are limited, 0 if they are not.
*/
static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
{
/* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP
* capability
*/
if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user_ns,
CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
/**
* cap_capset - Validate and apply proposed changes to current's capabilities
* @new: The proposed new credentials; alterations should be made here
* @old: The current task's current credentials
* @effective: A pointer to the proposed new effective capabilities set
* @inheritable: A pointer to the proposed new inheritable capabilities set
* @permitted: A pointer to the proposed new permitted capabilities set
*
* This function validates and applies a proposed mass change to the current
* process's capability sets. The changes are made to the proposed new
* credentials, and assuming no error, will be committed by the caller of LSM.
*/
int cap_capset(struct cred *new,
const struct cred *old,
const kernel_cap_t *effective,
const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
if (cap_inh_is_capped() &&
!cap_issubset(*inheritable,
cap_combine(old->cap_inheritable,
old->cap_permitted)))
/* incapable of using this inheritable set */
return -EPERM;
if (!cap_issubset(*inheritable,
cap_combine(old->cap_inheritable,
old->cap_bset)))
/* no new pI capabilities outside bounding set */
return -EPERM;
/* verify restrictions on target's new Permitted set */
if (!cap_issubset(*permitted, old->cap_permitted))
return -EPERM;
/* verify the _new_Effective_ is a subset of the _new_Permitted_ */
if (!cap_issubset(*effective, *permitted))
return -EPERM;
new->cap_effective = *effective;
new->cap_inheritable = *inheritable;
new->cap_permitted = *permitted;
/*
* Mask off ambient bits that are no longer both permitted and
* inheritable.
*/
new->cap_ambient = cap_intersect(new->cap_ambient,
cap_intersect(*permitted,
*inheritable));
if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new)))
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
/*
* Clear proposed capability sets for execve().
*/
static inline void bprm_clear_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
cap_clear(bprm->cred->cap_permitted);
bprm->cap_effective = false;
}
/**
* cap_inode_need_killpriv - Determine if inode change affects privileges
* @dentry: The inode/dentry in being changed with change marked ATTR_KILL_PRIV
*
* Determine if an inode having a change applied that's marked ATTR_KILL_PRIV
* affects the security markings on that inode, and if it is, should
* inode_killpriv() be invoked or the change rejected?
*
* Returns 0 if granted; +ve if granted, but inode_killpriv() is required; and
* -ve to deny the change.
*/
int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
int error;
error = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, NULL, 0);
return error > 0;
}
/**
* cap_inode_killpriv - Erase the security markings on an inode
* @dentry: The inode/dentry to alter
*
* Erase the privilege-enhancing security markings on an inode.
*
* Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error.
*/
int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
{
int error;
error = __vfs_removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS);
if (error == -EOPNOTSUPP)
error = 0;
return error;
}
/*
* Calculate the new process capability sets from the capability sets attached
* to a file.
*/
static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps,
struct linux_binprm *bprm,
bool *effective,
bool *has_cap)
{
struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
unsigned i;
int ret = 0;
if (caps->magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE)
*effective = true;
if (caps->magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK)
*has_cap = true;
CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
__u32 permitted = caps->permitted.cap[i];
__u32 inheritable = caps->inheritable.cap[i];
/*
* pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI)
* The addition of pA' is handled later.
*/
new->cap_permitted.cap[i] =
(new->cap_bset.cap[i] & permitted) |
(new->cap_inheritable.cap[i] & inheritable);
if (permitted & ~new->cap_permitted.cap[i])
/* insufficient to execute correctly */
ret = -EPERM;
}
/*
* For legacy apps, with no internal support for recognizing they
* do not have enough capabilities, we return an error if they are
* missing some "forced" (aka file-permitted) capabilities.
*/
return *effective ? ret : 0;
}
/*
* Extract the on-exec-apply capability sets for an executable file.
*/
int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps)
{
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
__u32 magic_etc;
unsigned tocopy, i;
int size;
struct vfs_cap_data caps;
memset(cpu_caps, 0, sizeof(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data));
if (!inode)
return -ENODATA;
size = __vfs_getxattr((struct dentry *)dentry, inode,
XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &caps, XATTR_CAPS_SZ);
if (size == -ENODATA || size == -EOPNOTSUPP)
/* no data, that's ok */
return -ENODATA;
if (size < 0)
return size;
if (size < sizeof(magic_etc))
return -EINVAL;
cpu_caps->magic_etc = magic_etc = le32_to_cpu(caps.magic_etc);
switch (magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) {
case VFS_CAP_REVISION_1:
if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_1)
return -EINVAL;
tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_1;
break;
case VFS_CAP_REVISION_2:
if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2)
return -EINVAL;
tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_2;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
if (i >= tocopy)
break;
cpu_caps->permitted.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps.data[i].permitted);
cpu_caps->inheritable.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps.data[i].inheritable);
}
cpu_caps->permitted.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
cpu_caps->inheritable.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
return 0;
}
/*
* Attempt to get the on-exec apply capability sets for an executable file from
* its xattrs and, if present, apply them to the proposed credentials being
* constructed by execve().
*/
static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_cap)
{
int rc = 0;
struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
bprm_clear_caps(bprm);
if (!file_caps_enabled)
return 0;
if (!mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt))
return 0;
/*
* This check is redundant with mnt_may_suid() but is kept to make
* explicit that capability bits are limited to s_user_ns and its
* descendants.
*/
if (!current_in_userns(bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb->s_user_ns))
return 0;
rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
if (rc < 0) {
if (rc == -EINVAL)
printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: get_vfs_caps_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
__func__, rc, bprm->filename);
else if (rc == -ENODATA)
rc = 0;
goto out;
}
rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective, has_cap);
if (rc == -EINVAL)
printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: cap_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
__func__, rc, bprm->filename);
out:
if (rc)
bprm_clear_caps(bprm);
return rc;
}
/**
* cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve().
* @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds
*
* Set up the proposed credentials for a new execution context being
* constructed by execve(). The proposed creds in @bprm->cred is altered,
* which won't take effect immediately. Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error.
*/
int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
const struct cred *old = current_cred();
struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
bool effective, has_cap = false, is_setid;
int ret;
kuid_t root_uid;
if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(old)))
return -EPERM;
effective = false;
ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_cap);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0);
if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
/*
* If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs
* for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it
* for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin.
*/
if (has_cap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) {
warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename);
goto skip;
}
/*
* To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
* executables under compatibility mode, we override the
* capability sets for the file.
*
* If only the real uid is 0, we do not set the effective bit.
*/
if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)) {
/* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */
new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(old->cap_bset,
old->cap_inheritable);
}
if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid))
effective = true;
}
skip:
/* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */
if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted))
bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
/* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised
* credentials unless they have the appropriate permit.
*
* In addition, if NO_NEW_PRIVS, then ensure we get no new privs.
*/
is_setid = !uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid) || !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid);
if ((is_setid ||
!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) &&
bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) {
/* downgrade; they get no more than they had, and maybe less */
if (!capable(CAP_SETUID) ||
(bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS)) {
new->euid = new->uid;
new->egid = new->gid;
}
new->cap_permitted = cap_intersect(new->cap_permitted,
old->cap_permitted);
}
new->suid = new->fsuid = new->euid;
new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid;
/* File caps or setid cancels ambient. */
if (has_cap || is_setid)
cap_clear(new->cap_ambient);
/*
* Now that we've computed pA', update pP' to give:
* pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) | pA'
*/
new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(new->cap_permitted, new->cap_ambient);
/*
* Set pE' = (fE ? pP' : pA'). Because pA' is zero if fE is set,
* this is the same as pE' = (fE ? pP' : 0) | pA'.
*/
if (effective)
new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted;
else
new->cap_effective = new->cap_ambient;
if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new)))
return -EPERM;
bprm->cap_effective = effective;
/*
* Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set
*
* We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true:
* 1) cap_effective has all caps
* 2) we are root
* 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT)
* Since this is just a normal root execing a process.
*
* Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think
* that is interesting information to audit.
*/
if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_effective, new->cap_ambient)) {
if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, new->cap_effective) ||
!uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) ||
issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
}
new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new)))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
/**
* cap_bprm_secureexec - Determine whether a secure execution is required
* @bprm: The execution parameters
*
* Determine whether a secure execution is required, return 1 if it is, and 0
* if it is not.
*
* The credentials have been committed by this point, and so are no longer
* available through @bprm->cred.
*/
int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
kuid_t root_uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, 0);
if (!uid_eq(cred->uid, root_uid)) {
if (bprm->cap_effective)
return 1;
if (!cap_issubset(cred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_ambient))
return 1;
}
return (!uid_eq(cred->euid, cred->uid) ||
!gid_eq(cred->egid, cred->gid));
}
/**
* cap_inode_setxattr - Determine whether an xattr may be altered
* @dentry: The inode/dentry being altered
* @name: The name of the xattr to be changed
* @value: The value that the xattr will be changed to
* @size: The size of value
* @flags: The replacement flag
*
* Determine whether an xattr may be altered or set on an inode, returning 0 if
* permission is granted, -ve if denied.
*
* This is used to make sure security xattrs don't get updated or set by those
* who aren't privileged to do so.
*/
int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) &&
!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
/**
* cap_inode_removexattr - Determine whether an xattr may be removed
* @dentry: The inode/dentry being altered
* @name: The name of the xattr to be changed
*
* Determine whether an xattr may be removed from an inode, returning 0 if
* permission is granted, -ve if denied.
*
* This is used to make sure security xattrs don't get removed by those who
* aren't privileged to remove them.
*/
int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
{
if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) &&
!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
/*
* cap_emulate_setxuid() fixes the effective / permitted capabilities of
* a process after a call to setuid, setreuid, or setresuid.
*
* 1) When set*uiding _from_ one of {r,e,s}uid == 0 _to_ all of
* {r,e,s}uid != 0, the permitted and effective capabilities are
* cleared.
*
* 2) When set*uiding _from_ euid == 0 _to_ euid != 0, the effective
* capabilities of the process are cleared.
*
* 3) When set*uiding _from_ euid != 0 _to_ euid == 0, the effective
* capabilities are set to the permitted capabilities.
*
* fsuid is handled elsewhere. fsuid == 0 and {r,e,s}uid!= 0 should
* never happen.
*
* -astor
*
* cevans - New behaviour, Oct '99
* A process may, via prctl(), elect to keep its capabilities when it
* calls setuid() and switches away from uid==0. Both permitted and
* effective sets will be retained.
* Without this change, it was impossible for a daemon to drop only some
* of its privilege. The call to setuid(!=0) would drop all privileges!
* Keeping uid 0 is not an option because uid 0 owns too many vital
* files..
* Thanks to Olaf Kirch and Peter Benie for spotting this.
*/
static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{
kuid_t root_uid = make_kuid(old->user_ns, 0);
if ((uid_eq(old->uid, root_uid) ||
uid_eq(old->euid, root_uid) ||
uid_eq(old->suid, root_uid)) &&
(!uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) &&
!uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) &&
!uid_eq(new->suid, root_uid))) {
if (!issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) {
cap_clear(new->cap_permitted);
cap_clear(new->cap_effective);
}
/*
* Pre-ambient programs expect setresuid to nonroot followed
* by exec to drop capabilities. We should make sure that
* this remains the case.
*/
cap_clear(new->cap_ambient);
}
if (uid_eq(old->euid, root_uid) && !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid))
cap_clear(new->cap_effective);
if (!uid_eq(old->euid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid))
new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted;
}
/**
* cap_task_fix_setuid - Fix up the results of setuid() call
* @new: The proposed credentials
* @old: The current task's current credentials
* @flags: Indications of what has changed
*
* Fix up the results of setuid() call before the credential changes are
* actually applied, returning 0 to grant the changes, -ve to deny them.
*/
int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags)
{
switch (flags) {
case LSM_SETID_RE:
case LSM_SETID_ID:
case LSM_SETID_RES:
/* juggle the capabilities to follow [RES]UID changes unless
* otherwise suppressed */
if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP))
cap_emulate_setxuid(new, old);
break;
case LSM_SETID_FS:
/* juggle the capabilties to follow FSUID changes, unless
* otherwise suppressed
*
* FIXME - is fsuser used for all CAP_FS_MASK capabilities?
* if not, we might be a bit too harsh here.
*/
if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
kuid_t root_uid = make_kuid(old->user_ns, 0);
if (uid_eq(old->fsuid, root_uid) && !uid_eq(new->fsuid, root_uid))
new->cap_effective =
cap_drop_fs_set(new->cap_effective);
if (!uid_eq(old->fsuid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->fsuid, root_uid))
new->cap_effective =
cap_raise_fs_set(new->cap_effective,
new->cap_permitted);
}
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Rationale: code calling task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, and
* task_setnice, assumes that
* . if capable(cap_sys_nice), then those actions should be allowed
* . if not capable(cap_sys_nice), but acting on your own processes,
* then those actions should be allowed
* This is insufficient now since you can call code without suid, but
* yet with increased caps.
* So we check for increased caps on the target process.
*/
static int cap_safe_nice(struct task_struct *p)
{
int is_subset, ret = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
is_subset = cap_issubset(__task_cred(p)->cap_permitted,
current_cred()->cap_permitted);
if (!is_subset && !ns_capable(__task_cred(p)->user_ns, CAP_SYS_NICE))
ret = -EPERM;
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
/**
* cap_task_setscheduler - Detemine if scheduler policy change is permitted
* @p: The task to affect
*
* Detemine if the requested scheduler policy change is permitted for the
* specified task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
*/
int cap_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
{
return cap_safe_nice(p);
}
/**
* cap_task_ioprio - Detemine if I/O priority change is permitted
* @p: The task to affect
* @ioprio: The I/O priority to set
*
* Detemine if the requested I/O priority change is permitted for the specified
* task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
*/
int cap_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
{
return cap_safe_nice(p);
}
/**
* cap_task_ioprio - Detemine if task priority change is permitted
* @p: The task to affect
* @nice: The nice value to set
*
* Detemine if the requested task priority change is permitted for the
* specified task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
*/
int cap_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
{
return cap_safe_nice(p);
}
/*
* Implement PR_CAPBSET_DROP. Attempt to remove the specified capability from
* the current task's bounding set. Returns 0 on success, -ve on error.
*/
static int cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap)
{
struct cred *new;
if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETPCAP))
return -EPERM;
if (!cap_valid(cap))
return -EINVAL;
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
cap_lower(new->cap_bset, cap);
return commit_creds(new);
}
/**
* cap_task_prctl - Implement process control functions for this security module
* @option: The process control function requested
* @arg2, @arg3, @arg4, @arg5: The argument data for this function
*
* Allow process control functions (sys_prctl()) to alter capabilities; may
* also deny access to other functions not otherwise implemented here.
*
* Returns 0 or +ve on success, -ENOSYS if this function is not implemented
* here, other -ve on error. If -ENOSYS is returned, sys_prctl() and other LSM
* modules will consider performing the function.
*/
int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
{
const struct cred *old = current_cred();
struct cred *new;
switch (option) {
case PR_CAPBSET_READ:
if (!cap_valid(arg2))
return -EINVAL;
return !!cap_raised(old->cap_bset, arg2);
case PR_CAPBSET_DROP:
return cap_prctl_drop(arg2);
/*
* The next four prctl's remain to assist with transitioning a
* system from legacy UID=0 based privilege (when filesystem
* capabilities are not in use) to a system using filesystem
* capabilities only - as the POSIX.1e draft intended.
*
* Note:
*
* PR_SET_SECUREBITS =
* issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED)
* | issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT)
* | issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED)
* | issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)
* | issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED)
*
* will ensure that the current process and all of its
* children will be locked into a pure
* capability-based-privilege environment.
*/
case PR_SET_SECUREBITS:
if ((((old->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS) >> 1)
& (old->securebits ^ arg2)) /*[1]*/
|| ((old->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/
|| (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/
|| (cap_capable(current_cred(),
current_cred()->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP,
SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0) /*[4]*/
/*
* [1] no changing of bits that are locked
* [2] no unlocking of locks
* [3] no setting of unsupported bits
* [4] doing anything requires privilege (go read about
* the "sendmail capabilities bug")
*/
)
/* cannot change a locked bit */
return -EPERM;
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
new->securebits = arg2;
return commit_creds(new);
case PR_GET_SECUREBITS:
return old->securebits;
case PR_GET_KEEPCAPS:
return !!issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
case PR_SET_KEEPCAPS:
if (arg2 > 1) /* Note, we rely on arg2 being unsigned here */
return -EINVAL;
if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED))
return -EPERM;
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
if (arg2)
new->securebits |= issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
else
new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
return commit_creds(new);
case PR_CAP_AMBIENT:
if (arg2 == PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL) {
if (arg3 | arg4 | arg5)
return -EINVAL;
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
cap_clear(new->cap_ambient);
return commit_creds(new);
}
if (((!cap_valid(arg3)) | arg4 | arg5))
return -EINVAL;
if (arg2 == PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET) {
return !!cap_raised(current_cred()->cap_ambient, arg3);
} else if (arg2 != PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE &&
arg2 != PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER) {
return -EINVAL;
} else {
if (arg2 == PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE &&
(!cap_raised(current_cred()->cap_permitted, arg3) ||
!cap_raised(current_cred()->cap_inheritable,
arg3) ||
issecure(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE)))
return -EPERM;
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
if (arg2 == PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE)
cap_raise(new->cap_ambient, arg3);
else
cap_lower(new->cap_ambient, arg3);
return commit_creds(new);
}
default:
/* No functionality available - continue with default */
return -ENOSYS;
}
}
/**
* cap_vm_enough_memory - Determine whether a new virtual mapping is permitted
* @mm: The VM space in which the new mapping is to be made
* @pages: The size of the mapping
*
* Determine whether the allocation of a new virtual mapping by the current
* task is permitted, returning 1 if permission is granted, 0 if not.
*/
int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
{
int cap_sys_admin = 0;
if (cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0)
cap_sys_admin = 1;
return cap_sys_admin;
}
/*
* cap_mmap_addr - check if able to map given addr
* @addr: address attempting to be mapped
*
* If the process is attempting to map memory below dac_mmap_min_addr they need
* CAP_SYS_RAWIO. The other parameters to this function are unused by the
* capability security module. Returns 0 if this mapping should be allowed
* -EPERM if not.
*/
int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
{
int ret = 0;
if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) {
ret = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
/* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */
if (ret == 0)
current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
}
return ret;
}
int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
{
return 0;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, cap_capable),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(settime, cap_settime),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, cap_ptrace_access_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, cap_ptrace_traceme),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, cap_capget),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, cap_capset),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, cap_bprm_set_creds),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, cap_bprm_secureexec),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_need_killpriv, cap_inode_need_killpriv),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_killpriv, cap_inode_killpriv),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, cap_mmap_addr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, cap_mmap_file),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, cap_task_fix_setuid),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prctl, cap_task_prctl),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, cap_task_setscheduler),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, cap_task_setioprio),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, cap_task_setnice),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, cap_vm_enough_memory),
};
void __init capability_add_hooks(void)
{
security_add_hooks(capability_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(capability_hooks));
}
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
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