svn+ssh://pythondev@svn.python.org/python/branches/py3k
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r87873 | r.david.murray | 2011-01-08 21:35:24 -0500 (Sat, 08 Jan 2011) | 12 lines
#5871: protect against header injection attacks.
This makes Header.encode throw a HeaderParseError if it winds up
formatting a header such that a continuation line has no leading
whitespace and looks like a header. Since Header accepts values
containing newlines and preserves them (and this is by design), without
this fix any program that took user input (say, a subject in a web form)
and passed it to the email package as a header was vulnerable to header
injection attacks. (As far as we know this has never been exploited.)
Thanks to Jakub Wilk for reporting this vulnerability.
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svn+ssh://pythondev@svn.python.org/python/branches/py3k
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r83690 | r.david.murray | 2010-08-03 18:14:10 -0400 (Tue, 03 Aug 2010) | 10 lines
#3196: if needed pad a short base64 encoded word before trying to decode.
The RFCs encourage following Postel's law: be liberal in what you accept.
So if someone forgot to pad the base64 encoded word payload to an
even four bytes, we add the padding before handing it to base64mime.decode.
Previously, missing padding resulted in a HeaderParseError.
Patch by Jason Williams.
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2047-like headers where there is no whitespace between encoded words. This
fix changes the matching regexp to include a trailing lookahead assertion that
the closing ?= must be followed by whitespace, newline, or end-of-string.
This also changes the regexp to add the MULTILINE flag.
Ezio Melotti
R. David Murray
Amaury Forgeot d'Arc
Brett Cannon
Barry Warsaw