Instances of `ssl.SSLSocket` were vulnerable to a bypass of the TLS handshake
and included protections (like certificate verification) and treating sent
unencrypted data as if it were post-handshake TLS encrypted data.
The vulnerability is caused when a socket is connected, data is sent by the
malicious peer and stored in a buffer, and then the malicious peer closes the
socket within a small timing window before the other peers’ TLS handshake can
begin. After this sequence of events the closed socket will not immediately
attempt a TLS handshake due to not being connected but will also allow the
buffered data to be read as if a successful TLS handshake had occurred.
Co-authored-by: Gregory P. Smith [Google LLC] <greg@krypto.org>
Detect email address parsing errors and return empty tuple to indicate the parsing error (old API). This fixes or at least ameliorates CVE-2023-27043.
---------
Co-authored-by: Gregory P. Smith <greg@krypto.org>
Upgrade builds to OpenSSL 1.1.1u.
This OpenSSL version addresses a pile if less-urgent CVEs since 1.1.1t.
The Mac/BuildScript/build-installer.py was already updated.
Also updates _ssl_data_111.h from OpenSSL 1.1.1u, _ssl_data_300.h from 3.0.9, and adds a new _ssl_data_31.h file from 3.1.1 along with the ssl.c code to use it.
Manual edits to the _ssl_data_300.h file prevent it from removing any existing definitions in case those exist in some peoples builds and were important (avoiding regressions during backporting).
backports of this prior to 3.12 will not include the openssl 3.1 header.
* Fix directory traversal security flaw in uu.decode()
* also check absolute paths and os.altsep
* Add a regression test.
---------
Co-authored-by: Gregory P. Smith <greg@krypto.org> [Google]
Replaces our built-in SHA3 implementation with a verified one from the HACL* project.
This implementation is used when OpenSSL does not provide SHA3 or is not present.
3.11 shiped with a very slow tiny sha3 implementation to get off of the <=3.10 reference implementation that wound up having serious bugs. This brings us back to a reasonably performing built-in implementation consistent with what we've just replaced our other guaranteed available standard hash algorithms with: code from the HACL* project.
---------
Co-authored-by: Gregory P. Smith <greg@krypto.org>
Do not expose the local server's on-disk location from `SimpleHTTPRequestHandler` when generating a directory index. (unnecessary information disclosure)
---------
Co-authored-by: Gregory P. Smith <greg@krypto.org>
Co-authored-by: Jelle Zijlstra <jelle.zijlstra@gmail.com>
Replace the builtin hashlib implementations of SHA2-384 and SHA2-512
originally from LibTomCrypt with formally verified, side-channel resistant
code from the [HACL*](https://github.com/hacl-star/hacl-star/) project.
The builtins remain a fallback only used when OpenSSL does not provide them.
replacing hashlib primitives (for the non-OpenSSL case) with verified implementations from HACL*. This is the first PR in the series, and focuses specifically on SHA2-256 and SHA2-224.
This PR imports Hacl_Streaming_SHA2 into the Python tree. This is the HACL* implementation of SHA2, which combines a core implementation of SHA2 along with a layer of buffer management that allows updating the digest with any number of bytes. This supersedes the previous implementation in the tree.
@franziskuskiefer was kind enough to benchmark the changes: in addition to being verified (thus providing significant safety and security improvements), this implementation also provides a sizeable performance boost!
```
---------------------------------------------------------------
Benchmark Time CPU Iterations
---------------------------------------------------------------
Sha2_256_Streaming 3163 ns 3160 ns 219353 // this PR
LibTomCrypt_Sha2_256 5057 ns 5056 ns 136234 // library used by Python currently
```
The changes in this PR are as follows:
- import the subset of HACL* that covers SHA2-256/224 into `Modules/_hacl`
- rewire sha256module.c to use the HACL* implementation
Co-authored-by: Gregory P. Smith [Google LLC] <greg@krypto.org>
Co-authored-by: Erlend E. Aasland <erlend.aasland@protonmail.com>
Replace control characters in http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler.log_message with an escaped \xHH sequence to avoid causing problems for the terminal the output is printed to.
There was an unnecessary quadratic loop in idna decoding. This restores
the behavior to linear.
This also adds an early length check in IDNA decoding to outright reject
huge inputs early on given the ultimate result is defined to be 63 or fewer
characters.
Linux abstract sockets are insecure as they lack any form of filesystem
permissions so their use allows anyone on the system to inject code into
the process.
This removes the default preference for abstract sockets in
multiprocessing introduced in Python 3.9+ via
https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/18866 while fixing
https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/84031.
Explicit use of an abstract socket by a user now generates a
RuntimeWarning. If we choose to keep this warning, it should be
backported to the 3.7 and 3.8 branches.
Fix a shell code injection vulnerability in the
get-remote-certificate.py example script. The script no longer uses a
shell to run "openssl" commands. Issue reported and initial fix by
Caleb Shortt.
Remove the Windows code path to send "quit" on stdin to the "openssl
s_client" command: use DEVNULL on all platforms instead.
Co-authored-by: Caleb Shortt <caleb@rgauge.com>
Fix multiplying a list by an integer (list *= int): detect the
integer overflow when the new allocated length is close to the
maximum size. Issue reported by Jordan Limor.
list_resize() now checks for integer overflow before multiplying the
new allocated length by the list item size (sizeof(PyObject*)).
Converting a large enough `int` to a decimal string raises `ValueError` as expected. However, the raise comes _after_ the quadratic-time base-conversion algorithm has run to completion. For effective DOS prevention, we need some kind of check before entering the quadratic-time loop. Oops! =)
The quick fix: essentially we catch _most_ values that exceed the threshold up front. Those that slip through will still be on the small side (read: sufficiently fast), and will get caught by the existing check so that the limit remains exact.
The justification for the current check. The C code check is:
```c
max_str_digits / (3 * PyLong_SHIFT) <= (size_a - 11) / 10
```
In GitHub markdown math-speak, writing $M$ for `max_str_digits`, $L$ for `PyLong_SHIFT` and $s$ for `size_a`, that check is:
$$\left\lfloor\frac{M}{3L}\right\rfloor \le \left\lfloor\frac{s - 11}{10}\right\rfloor$$
From this it follows that
$$\frac{M}{3L} < \frac{s-1}{10}$$
hence that
$$\frac{L(s-1)}{M} > \frac{10}{3} > \log_2(10).$$
So
$$2^{L(s-1)} > 10^M.$$
But our input integer $a$ satisfies $|a| \ge 2^{L(s-1)}$, so $|a|$ is larger than $10^M$. This shows that we don't accidentally capture anything _below_ the intended limit in the check.
<!-- gh-issue-number: gh-95778 -->
* Issue: gh-95778
<!-- /gh-issue-number -->
Co-authored-by: Gregory P. Smith [Google LLC] <greg@krypto.org>
Integer to and from text conversions via CPython's bignum `int` type is not safe against denial of service attacks due to malicious input. Very large input strings with hundred thousands of digits can consume several CPU seconds.
This PR comes fresh from a pile of work done in our private PSRT security response team repo.
Signed-off-by: Christian Heimes [Red Hat] <christian@python.org>
Tons-of-polishing-up-by: Gregory P. Smith [Google] <greg@krypto.org>
Reviews via the private PSRT repo via many others (see the NEWS entry in the PR).
<!-- gh-issue-number: gh-95778 -->
* Issue: gh-95778
<!-- /gh-issue-number -->
I wrote up [a one pager for the release managers](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1KjuF_aXlzPUxTK4BMgezGJ2Pn7uevfX7g0_mvgHlL7Y/edit#). Much of that text wound up in the Issue. Backports PRs already exist. See the issue for links.
Fix an open redirection vulnerability in the `http.server` module when
an URI path starts with `//` that could produce a 301 Location header
with a misleading target. Vulnerability discovered, and logic fix
proposed, by Hamza Avvan (@hamzaavvan).
Test and comments authored by Gregory P. Smith [Google].
Note: This change is not effective on Microsoft Windows.
Cookies can store sensitive information and should therefore be protected
against unauthorized third parties. This is also described in issue #79096.
The filesystem permissions are currently set to 644, everyone can read the
file. This commit changes the permissions to 600, only the creater of the file
can read and modify it. This improves security, because it reduces the attack
surface. Now the attacker needs control of the user that created the cookie or
a ways to circumvent the filesystems permissions.
This change is backwards incompatible. Systems that rely on world-readable
cookies will breake. However, one could argue that those are misconfigured in
the first place.
Add the -P command line option and the PYTHONSAFEPATH environment
variable to not prepend a potentially unsafe path to sys.path.
* Add sys.flags.safe_path flag.
* Add PyConfig.safe_path member.
* Programs/_bootstrap_python.c uses config.safe_path=0.
* Update subprocess._optim_args_from_interpreter_flags() to handle
the -P command line option.
* Modules/getpath.py sets safe_path to 1 if a "._pth" file is
present.
Update the vendored copy of libexpat to 2.4.1 (from 2.2.8) to get the
fix for the CVE-2013-0340 "Billion Laughs" vulnerability. This copy
is most used on Windows and macOS.
Co-authored-by: Łukasz Langa <lukasz@langa.pl>
Thomas Wouters
Zachary Ware
Łukasz Langa
Mark Shannon
Illia Volochii
Gregory P. Smith
Thomas Dwyer
Jonathan Protzenko
Sam Carroll
Ethan Furman
Oleg Iarygin
Steve Dower
Shaun Walbridge
Victor Stinner
Mark Dickinson
Gregory P. Smith
Ken Jin
Pascal Wittmann
Petr Viktorin
Pablo Galindo
Miguel Brito
E-Paine
Charles Burkland
Sergey Fedoseev
Ned Deily