Merged revisions 86419 via svnmerge from
svn+ssh://pythondev@svn.python.org/python/branches/py3k ........ r86419 | r.david.murray | 2010-11-11 19:35:31 -0500 (Thu, 11 Nov 2010) | 4 lines #7950: add warning about security implications of shell=True to subprocess docs Patch by Chris Rebert. ........
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@ -75,6 +75,24 @@ This module defines one class called :class:`Popen`:
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Popen(['/bin/sh', '-c', args[0], args[1], ...])
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.. warning::
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Executing shell commands that incorporate unsanitized input from an
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untrusted source makes a program vulnerable to `shell injection
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<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shell_injection#Shell_injection>`_,
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a serious security flaw which can result in arbitrary command execution.
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For this reason, the use of *shell=True* is **strongly discouraged** in cases
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where the command string is constructed from external input::
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>>> from subprocess import call
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>>> filename = input("What file would you like to display?\n")
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What file would you like to display?
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non_existent; rm -rf / #
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>>> call("cat " + filename, shell=True) # Uh-oh. This will end badly...
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*shell=False* does not suffer from this vulnerability; the above Note may be
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helpful in getting code using *shell=False* to work.
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On Windows: the :class:`Popen` class uses CreateProcess() to execute the child
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program, which operates on strings. If *args* is a sequence, it will be
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converted to a string using the :meth:`list2cmdline` method. Please note that
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