/* This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for more details. You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along with this program. If not, see . */ #include "AP_Arming_config.h" #if AP_ARMING_ENABLED #include "AP_Arming.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #if HAL_MAX_CAN_PROTOCOL_DRIVERS #include #include #include #include #include #endif #include #define AP_ARMING_COMPASS_MAGFIELD_EXPECTED 530 #define AP_ARMING_COMPASS_MAGFIELD_MIN 185 // 0.35 * 530 milligauss #define AP_ARMING_COMPASS_MAGFIELD_MAX 875 // 1.65 * 530 milligauss #define AP_ARMING_BOARD_VOLTAGE_MAX 5.8f #define AP_ARMING_ACCEL_ERROR_THRESHOLD 0.75f #define AP_ARMING_MAGFIELD_ERROR_THRESHOLD 100 #define AP_ARMING_AHRS_GPS_ERROR_MAX 10 // accept up to 10m difference between AHRS and GPS #if APM_BUILD_TYPE(APM_BUILD_ArduPlane) #define ARMING_RUDDER_DEFAULT (uint8_t)RudderArming::ARMONLY #else #define ARMING_RUDDER_DEFAULT (uint8_t)RudderArming::ARMDISARM #endif #ifndef PREARM_DISPLAY_PERIOD # define PREARM_DISPLAY_PERIOD 30 #endif extern const AP_HAL::HAL& hal; const AP_Param::GroupInfo AP_Arming::var_info[] = { // @Param{Plane, Rover}: REQUIRE // @DisplayName: Require Arming Motors // @Description: Arming disabled until some requirements are met. If 0, there are no requirements (arm immediately). If 1, sends the minimum throttle PWM value to the throttle channel when disarmed. If 2, send 0 PWM (no signal) to throttle channel when disarmed. On planes with ICE enabled and the throttle while disarmed option set in ICE_OPTIONS, the motor will always get THR_MIN when disarmed. Arming will occur using either rudder stick arming (if enabled) or GCS command when all mandatory and ARMING_CHECK items are satisfied. Note, when setting this parameter to 0, a reboot is required to immediately arm the plane. // @Values: 0:Disabled,1:minimum PWM when disarmed,2:0 PWM when disarmed // @User: Advanced AP_GROUPINFO_FLAGS_FRAME("REQUIRE", 0, AP_Arming, require, float(Required::YES_MIN_PWM), AP_PARAM_FLAG_NO_SHIFT, AP_PARAM_FRAME_PLANE | AP_PARAM_FRAME_ROVER), // 2 was the CHECK paramter stored in a AP_Int16 // @Param: ACCTHRESH // @DisplayName: Accelerometer error threshold // @Description: Accelerometer error threshold used to determine inconsistent accelerometers. Compares this error range to other accelerometers to detect a hardware or calibration error. Lower value means tighter check and harder to pass arming check. Not all accelerometers are created equal. // @Units: m/s/s // @Range: 0.25 3.0 // @User: Advanced AP_GROUPINFO("ACCTHRESH", 3, AP_Arming, accel_error_threshold, AP_ARMING_ACCEL_ERROR_THRESHOLD), // index 4 was VOLT_MIN, moved to AP_BattMonitor // index 5 was VOLT2_MIN, moved to AP_BattMonitor // @Param: RUDDER // @DisplayName: Arming with Rudder enable/disable // @Description: Allow arm/disarm by rudder input. When enabled arming can be done with right rudder, disarming with left rudder. Rudder arming only works with throttle at zero +- deadzone (RCx_DZ). Depending on vehicle type, arming in certain modes is prevented. See the wiki for each vehicle. Caution is recommended when arming if it is allowed in an auto-throttle mode! // @Values: 0:Disabled,1:ArmingOnly,2:ArmOrDisarm // @User: Advanced AP_GROUPINFO_FRAME("RUDDER", 6, AP_Arming, _rudder_arming, ARMING_RUDDER_DEFAULT, AP_PARAM_FRAME_PLANE | AP_PARAM_FRAME_ROVER | AP_PARAM_FRAME_COPTER | AP_PARAM_FRAME_TRICOPTER | AP_PARAM_FRAME_HELI | AP_PARAM_FRAME_BLIMP), // @Param: MIS_ITEMS // @DisplayName: Required mission items // @Description: Bitmask of mission items that are required to be planned in order to arm the aircraft // @Bitmask: 0:Land,1:VTOL Land,2:DO_LAND_START,3:Takeoff,4:VTOL Takeoff,5:Rallypoint,6:RTL // @User: Advanced AP_GROUPINFO("MIS_ITEMS", 7, AP_Arming, _required_mission_items, 0), // @Param: CHECK // @DisplayName: Arm Checks to Perform (bitmask) // @Description: Checks prior to arming motor. This is a bitmask of checks that will be performed before allowing arming. For most users it is recommended to leave this at the default of 1 (all checks enabled). You can select whatever checks you prefer by adding together the values of each check type to set this parameter. For example, to only allow arming when you have GPS lock and no RC failsafe you would set ARMING_CHECK to 72. // @Bitmask: 0:All,1:Barometer,2:Compass,3:GPS lock,4:INS,5:Parameters,6:RC Channels,7:Board voltage,8:Battery Level,10:Logging Available,11:Hardware safety switch,12:GPS Configuration,13:System,14:Mission,15:Rangefinder,16:Camera,17:AuxAuth,18:VisualOdometry,19:FFT // @Bitmask{Plane}: 0:All,1:Barometer,2:Compass,3:GPS lock,4:INS,5:Parameters,6:RC Channels,7:Board voltage,8:Battery Level,9:Airspeed,10:Logging Available,11:Hardware safety switch,12:GPS Configuration,13:System,14:Mission,15:Rangefinder,16:Camera,17:AuxAuth,19:FFT // @User: Standard AP_GROUPINFO("CHECK", 8, AP_Arming, checks_to_perform, ARMING_CHECK_ALL), // @Param: OPTIONS // @DisplayName: Arming options // @Description: Options that can be applied to change arming behaviour // @Bitmask: 0:Disable prearm display,1:Do not send status text on state change // @User: Advanced AP_GROUPINFO("OPTIONS", 9, AP_Arming, _arming_options, 0), // @Param: MAGTHRESH // @DisplayName: Compass magnetic field strength error threshold vs earth magnetic model // @Description: Compass magnetic field strength error threshold vs earth magnetic model. X and y axis are compared using this threhold, Z axis uses 2x this threshold. 0 to disable check // @Units: mGauss // @Range: 0 500 // @User: Advanced AP_GROUPINFO("MAGTHRESH", 10, AP_Arming, magfield_error_threshold, AP_ARMING_MAGFIELD_ERROR_THRESHOLD), #if AP_ARMING_CRASHDUMP_ACK_ENABLED // @Param: CRSDP_IGN // @DisplayName: Disable CrashDump Arming check // @Description: Must have value "1" if crashdump data is present on the system, or a prearm failure will be raised. Do not set this parameter unless the risks of doing so are fully understood. The presence of a crash dump means that the firmware currently installed has suffered a critical software failure which resulted in the autopilot immediately rebooting. The crashdump file gives diagnostic information which can help in finding the issue, please contact the ArduPIlot support team. If this crashdump data is present, the vehicle is likely unsafe to fly. Check the ArduPilot documentation for more details. // @Values: 0:Crash Dump arming check active, 1:Crash Dump arming check deactivated // @User: Advanced AP_GROUPINFO("CRSDP_IGN", 11, AP_Arming, crashdump_ack.acked, 0), #endif // AP_ARMING_CRASHDUMP_ACK_ENABLED AP_GROUPEND }; #if HAL_WITH_IO_MCU #include extern AP_IOMCU iomcu; #endif #pragma GCC diagnostic push #if defined (__clang__) #pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wbitwise-instead-of-logical" #endif AP_Arming::AP_Arming() { if (_singleton) { AP_HAL::panic("Too many AP_Arming instances"); } _singleton = this; AP_Param::setup_object_defaults(this, var_info); } // performs pre-arm checks. expects to be called at 1hz. void AP_Arming::update(void) { #if AP_ARMING_CRASHDUMP_ACK_ENABLED // if we boot with no crashdump data present, reset the "ignore" // parameter so the user will need to acknowledge future crashes // too: crashdump_ack.check_reset(); #endif const uint32_t now_ms = AP_HAL::millis(); // perform pre-arm checks & display failures every 30 seconds bool display_fail = false; if ((report_immediately && (now_ms - last_prearm_display_ms > 4000)) || (now_ms - last_prearm_display_ms > PREARM_DISPLAY_PERIOD*1000)) { report_immediately = false; display_fail = true; last_prearm_display_ms = now_ms; } // OTOH, the user may never want to display them: if (option_enabled(Option::DISABLE_PREARM_DISPLAY)) { display_fail = false; } pre_arm_checks(display_fail); } #if AP_ARMING_CRASHDUMP_ACK_ENABLED void AP_Arming::CrashDump::check_reset() { // if there is no crash dump data then clear the crash dump ack. // This means on subsequent crash-dumps appearing the user must // re-acknowledge. if (hal.util->last_crash_dump_size() == 0) { // no crash dump data acked.set_and_save_ifchanged(0); } } #endif // AP_ARMING_CRASHDUMP_ACK_ENABLED uint16_t AP_Arming::compass_magfield_expected() const { return AP_ARMING_COMPASS_MAGFIELD_EXPECTED; } bool AP_Arming::is_armed() const { return armed || arming_required() == Required::NO; } /* true if armed and safety is off */ bool AP_Arming::is_armed_and_safety_off() const { return is_armed() && hal.util->safety_switch_state() != AP_HAL::Util::SAFETY_DISARMED; } uint32_t AP_Arming::get_enabled_checks() const { return checks_to_perform; } bool AP_Arming::check_enabled(const enum AP_Arming::ArmingChecks check) const { if (checks_to_perform & ARMING_CHECK_ALL) { return true; } return (checks_to_perform & check); } void AP_Arming::check_failed(const enum AP_Arming::ArmingChecks check, bool report, const char *fmt, ...) const { if (!report) { return; } char taggedfmt[MAVLINK_MSG_STATUSTEXT_FIELD_TEXT_LEN+1]; // metafmt is wrapped around the passed-in format string to // prepend "PreArm" or "Arm", depending on what sorts of checks // we're currently doing. const char *metafmt = "PreArm: %s"; // it's formats all the way down if (running_arming_checks) { metafmt = "Arm: %s"; } hal.util->snprintf(taggedfmt, sizeof(taggedfmt), metafmt, fmt); #if HAL_GCS_ENABLED MAV_SEVERITY severity = MAV_SEVERITY_CRITICAL; if (!check_enabled(check)) { // technically should be NOTICE, but will annoy users at that level: severity = MAV_SEVERITY_DEBUG; } va_list arg_list; va_start(arg_list, fmt); gcs().send_textv(severity, taggedfmt, arg_list); va_end(arg_list); #endif // HAL_GCS_ENABLED } void AP_Arming::check_failed(bool report, const char *fmt, ...) const { #if HAL_GCS_ENABLED if (!report) { return; } char taggedfmt[MAVLINK_MSG_STATUSTEXT_FIELD_TEXT_LEN+1]; // metafmt is wrapped around the passed-in format string to // prepend "PreArm" or "Arm", depending on what sorts of checks // we're currently doing. const char *metafmt = "PreArm: %s"; // it's formats all the way down if (running_arming_checks) { metafmt = "Arm: %s"; } hal.util->snprintf(taggedfmt, sizeof(taggedfmt), metafmt, fmt); va_list arg_list; va_start(arg_list, fmt); gcs().send_textv(MAV_SEVERITY_CRITICAL, taggedfmt, arg_list); va_end(arg_list); #endif // HAL_GCS_ENABLED } bool AP_Arming::barometer_checks(bool report) { #ifdef HAL_BARO_ALLOW_INIT_NO_BARO return true; #endif #if CONFIG_HAL_BOARD == HAL_BOARD_SITL if (AP::sitl()->baro_count == 0) { // simulate no baro boards return true; } #endif if (check_enabled(ARMING_CHECK_BARO)) { char buffer[MAVLINK_MSG_STATUSTEXT_FIELD_TEXT_LEN+1] {}; if (!AP::baro().arming_checks(sizeof(buffer), buffer)) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_BARO, report, "Baro: %s", buffer); return false; } } return true; } #if AP_AIRSPEED_ENABLED bool AP_Arming::airspeed_checks(bool report) { if (check_enabled(ARMING_CHECK_AIRSPEED)) { const AP_Airspeed *airspeed = AP_Airspeed::get_singleton(); if (airspeed == nullptr) { // not an airspeed capable vehicle return true; } for (uint8_t i=0; ienabled(i) && airspeed->use(i) && !airspeed->healthy(i)) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_AIRSPEED, report, "Airspeed %d not healthy", i + 1); return false; } } } return true; } #endif // AP_AIRSPEED_ENABLED #if HAL_LOGGING_ENABLED bool AP_Arming::logging_checks(bool report) { if (check_enabled(ARMING_CHECK_LOGGING)) { if (!AP::logger().logging_present()) { // Logging is disabled, so nothing to check. return true; } if (AP::logger().logging_failed()) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_LOGGING, report, "Logging failed"); return false; } if (!AP::logger().CardInserted()) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_LOGGING, report, "No SD card"); return false; } if (AP::logger().in_log_download()) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_LOGGING, report, "Downloading logs"); return false; } } return true; } #endif // HAL_LOGGING_ENABLED #if AP_INERTIALSENSOR_ENABLED bool AP_Arming::ins_accels_consistent(const AP_InertialSensor &ins) { const uint32_t now = AP_HAL::millis(); if (!ins.accels_consistent(accel_error_threshold)) { // accels are inconsistent: last_accel_pass_ms = 0; return false; } if (last_accel_pass_ms == 0) { // we didn't return false above, so sensors are // consistent right now: last_accel_pass_ms = now; } // if accels can in theory be inconsistent, // must pass for at least 10 seconds before we're considered consistent: if (ins.get_accel_count() > 1 && now - last_accel_pass_ms < 10000) { return false; } return true; } bool AP_Arming::ins_gyros_consistent(const AP_InertialSensor &ins) { const uint32_t now = AP_HAL::millis(); // allow for up to 5 degrees/s difference if (!ins.gyros_consistent(5)) { // gyros are inconsistent: last_gyro_pass_ms = 0; return false; } // we didn't return false above, so sensors are // consistent right now: if (last_gyro_pass_ms == 0) { last_gyro_pass_ms = now; } // if gyros can in theory be inconsistent, // must pass for at least 10 seconds before we're considered consistent: if (ins.get_gyro_count() > 1 && now - last_gyro_pass_ms < 10000) { return false; } return true; } bool AP_Arming::ins_checks(bool report) { if (check_enabled(ARMING_CHECK_INS)) { const AP_InertialSensor &ins = AP::ins(); if (!ins.get_gyro_health_all()) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_INS, report, "Gyros not healthy"); return false; } if (!ins.gyro_calibrated_ok_all()) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_INS, report, "Gyros not calibrated"); return false; } if (!ins.get_accel_health_all()) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_INS, report, "Accels not healthy"); return false; } if (!ins.accel_calibrated_ok_all()) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_INS, report, "3D Accel calibration needed"); return false; } //check if accelerometers have calibrated and require reboot if (ins.accel_cal_requires_reboot()) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_INS, report, "Accels calibrated requires reboot"); return false; } // check all accelerometers point in roughly same direction if (!ins_accels_consistent(ins)) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_INS, report, "Accels inconsistent"); return false; } // check all gyros are giving consistent readings if (!ins_gyros_consistent(ins)) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_INS, report, "Gyros inconsistent"); return false; } // no arming while doing temp cal if (ins.temperature_cal_running()) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_INS, report, "temperature cal running"); return false; } #if AP_INERTIALSENSOR_BATCHSAMPLER_ENABLED // If Batch sampling enabled it must be initialized if (ins.batchsampler.enabled() && !ins.batchsampler.is_initialised()) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_INS, report, "Batch sampling requires reboot"); return false; } #endif } #if HAL_GYROFFT_ENABLED // gyros are healthy so check the FFT if (check_enabled(ARMING_CHECK_FFT)) { // Check that the noise analyser works AP_GyroFFT *fft = AP::fft(); char fail_msg[MAVLINK_MSG_STATUSTEXT_FIELD_TEXT_LEN+1]; if (fft != nullptr && !fft->pre_arm_check(fail_msg, ARRAY_SIZE(fail_msg))) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_INS, report, "%s", fail_msg); return false; } } #endif return true; } #endif // AP_INERTIALSENSOR_ENABLED bool AP_Arming::compass_checks(bool report) { Compass &_compass = AP::compass(); #if COMPASS_CAL_ENABLED // check if compass is calibrating if (_compass.is_calibrating()) { check_failed(report, "Compass calibration running"); return false; } // check if compass has calibrated and requires reboot if (_compass.compass_cal_requires_reboot()) { check_failed(report, "Compass calibrated requires reboot"); return false; } #endif if (check_enabled(ARMING_CHECK_COMPASS)) { // avoid Compass::use_for_yaw(void) as it implicitly calls healthy() which can // incorrectly skip the remaining checks, pass the primary instance directly if (!_compass.use_for_yaw(0)) { // compass use is disabled return true; } if (!_compass.healthy()) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_COMPASS, report, "Compass not healthy"); return false; } // check compass learning is on or offsets have been set #if !APM_BUILD_COPTER_OR_HELI && !APM_BUILD_TYPE(APM_BUILD_Blimp) // check compass offsets have been set if learning is off // copter and blimp always require configured compasses if (!_compass.learn_offsets_enabled()) #endif { char failure_msg[50] = {}; if (!_compass.configured(failure_msg, ARRAY_SIZE(failure_msg))) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_COMPASS, report, "%s", failure_msg); return false; } } // check for unreasonable compass offsets const Vector3f offsets = _compass.get_offsets(); if (offsets.length() > _compass.get_offsets_max()) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_COMPASS, report, "Compass offsets too high"); return false; } // check for unreasonable mag field length const float mag_field = _compass.get_field().length(); if (mag_field > AP_ARMING_COMPASS_MAGFIELD_MAX || mag_field < AP_ARMING_COMPASS_MAGFIELD_MIN) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_COMPASS, report, "Check mag field: %4.0f, max %d, min %d", (double)mag_field, AP_ARMING_COMPASS_MAGFIELD_MAX, AP_ARMING_COMPASS_MAGFIELD_MIN); return false; } // check all compasses point in roughly same direction if (!_compass.consistent()) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_COMPASS, report, "Compasses inconsistent"); return false; } #if AP_AHRS_ENABLED // if ahrs is using compass and we have location, check mag field versus expected earth magnetic model Location ahrs_loc; AP_AHRS &ahrs = AP::ahrs(); if ((magfield_error_threshold > 0) && ahrs.use_compass() && ahrs.get_location(ahrs_loc)) { const Vector3f veh_mag_field_ef = ahrs.get_rotation_body_to_ned() * _compass.get_field(); const Vector3f earth_field_mgauss = AP_Declination::get_earth_field_ga(ahrs_loc) * 1000.0; const Vector3f diff_mgauss = veh_mag_field_ef - earth_field_mgauss; if (MAX(fabsf(diff_mgauss.x), fabsf(diff_mgauss.y)) > magfield_error_threshold) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_COMPASS, report, "Check mag field (xy diff:%.0f>%d)", (double)MAX(fabsf(diff_mgauss.x), (double)fabsf(diff_mgauss.y)), (int)magfield_error_threshold); return false; } if (fabsf(diff_mgauss.x) > magfield_error_threshold*2.0) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_COMPASS, report, "Check mag field (z diff:%.0f>%d)", (double)fabsf(diff_mgauss.z), (int)magfield_error_threshold*2); return false; } } #endif // AP_AHRS_ENABLED } return true; } #if AP_GPS_ENABLED bool AP_Arming::gps_checks(bool report) { const AP_GPS &gps = AP::gps(); if (check_enabled(ARMING_CHECK_GPS)) { // Any failure messages from GPS backends char failure_msg[50] = {}; if (!AP::gps().pre_arm_checks(failure_msg, ARRAY_SIZE(failure_msg))) { if (failure_msg[0] != '\0') { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_GPS, report, "%s", failure_msg); } return false; } for (uint8_t i = 0; i < gps.num_sensors(); i++) { #if AP_GPS_BLENDED_ENABLED if ((i != GPS_BLENDED_INSTANCE) && #else if ( #endif (gps.get_type(i) == AP_GPS::GPS_Type::GPS_TYPE_NONE)) { if (gps.primary_sensor() == i) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_GPS, report, "GPS %i: primary but TYPE 0", i+1); return false; } continue; } //GPS OK? if (gps.status(i) < AP_GPS::GPS_OK_FIX_3D) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_GPS, report, "GPS %i: Bad fix", i+1); return false; } //GPS update rate acceptable if (!gps.is_healthy(i)) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_GPS, report, "GPS %i: not healthy", i+1); return false; } } if (!AP::ahrs().home_is_set()) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_GPS, report, "AHRS: waiting for home"); return false; } // check GPSs are within 50m of each other and that blending is healthy float distance_m; if (!gps.all_consistent(distance_m)) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_GPS, report, "GPS positions differ by %4.1fm", (double)distance_m); return false; } #if AP_GPS_BLENDED_ENABLED if (!gps.blend_health_check()) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_GPS, report, "GPS blending unhealthy"); return false; } #endif // check AHRS and GPS are within 10m of each other if (gps.num_sensors() > 0) { const Location gps_loc = gps.location(); Location ahrs_loc; if (AP::ahrs().get_location(ahrs_loc)) { const float distance = gps_loc.get_distance(ahrs_loc); if (distance > AP_ARMING_AHRS_GPS_ERROR_MAX) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_GPS, report, "GPS and AHRS differ by %4.1fm", (double)distance); return false; } } } } if (check_enabled(ARMING_CHECK_GPS_CONFIG)) { uint8_t first_unconfigured; if (gps.first_unconfigured_gps(first_unconfigured)) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_GPS_CONFIG, report, "GPS %d still configuring this GPS", first_unconfigured + 1); if (report) { gps.broadcast_first_configuration_failure_reason(); } return false; } } return true; } #endif // AP_GPS_ENABLED #if AP_BATTERY_ENABLED bool AP_Arming::battery_checks(bool report) { if (check_enabled(ARMING_CHECK_BATTERY)) { char buffer[MAVLINK_MSG_STATUSTEXT_FIELD_TEXT_LEN+1] {}; if (!AP::battery().arming_checks(sizeof(buffer), buffer)) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_BATTERY, report, "%s", buffer); return false; } } return true; } #endif // AP_BATTERY_ENABLED bool AP_Arming::hardware_safety_check(bool report) { if (check_enabled(ARMING_CHECK_SWITCH)) { // check if safety switch has been pushed if (hal.util->safety_switch_state() == AP_HAL::Util::SAFETY_DISARMED) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_SWITCH, report, "Hardware safety switch"); return false; } } return true; } #if AP_RC_CHANNEL_ENABLED bool AP_Arming::rc_arm_checks(AP_Arming::Method method) { // don't check the trims if we are in a failsafe if (!rc().has_valid_input()) { return true; } // only check if we've received some form of input within the last second // this is a protection against a vehicle having never enabled an input uint32_t last_input_ms = rc().last_input_ms(); if ((last_input_ms == 0) || ((AP_HAL::millis() - last_input_ms) > 1000)) { return true; } bool check_passed = true; // ensure all rc channels have different functions if (rc().duplicate_options_exist()) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_PARAMETERS, true, "Duplicate Aux Switch Options"); check_passed = false; } if (rc().flight_mode_channel_conflicts_with_rc_option()) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_PARAMETERS, true, "Mode channel and RC%d_OPTION conflict", rc().flight_mode_channel_number()); check_passed = false; } const RCMapper * rcmap = AP::rcmap(); if (rcmap != nullptr) { if (!rc().option_is_enabled(RC_Channels::Option::ARMING_SKIP_CHECK_RPY)) { const char *names[3] = {"Roll", "Pitch", "Yaw"}; const uint8_t channels[3] = {rcmap->roll(), rcmap->pitch(), rcmap->yaw()}; for (uint8_t i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(channels); i++) { const RC_Channel *c = rc().channel(channels[i] - 1); if (c == nullptr) { continue; } if (c->get_control_in() != 0) { if ((method != Method::RUDDER) || (c != rc().get_arming_channel())) { // ignore the yaw input channel if rudder arming check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_RC, true, "%s (RC%d) is not neutral", names[i], channels[i]); check_passed = false; } } } } // if throttle check is enabled, require zero input if (rc().arming_check_throttle()) { RC_Channel *c = rc().channel(rcmap->throttle() - 1); if (c != nullptr) { if (c->get_control_in() != 0) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_RC, true, "Throttle (RC%d) is not neutral", rcmap->throttle()); check_passed = false; } } c = rc().find_channel_for_option(RC_Channel::AUX_FUNC::FWD_THR); if (c != nullptr) { uint8_t fwd_thr = c->percent_input(); // require channel input within 2% of minimum if (fwd_thr > 2) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_RC, true, "VTOL Fwd Throttle is not zero"); check_passed = false; } } } } return check_passed; } bool AP_Arming::rc_calibration_checks(bool report) { bool check_passed = true; const uint8_t num_channels = RC_Channels::get_valid_channel_count(); for (uint8_t i = 0; i < NUM_RC_CHANNELS; i++) { const RC_Channel *c = rc().channel(i); if (c == nullptr) { continue; } if (i >= num_channels && !(c->has_override())) { continue; } const uint16_t trim = c->get_radio_trim(); if (c->get_radio_min() > trim) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_RC, report, "RC%d_MIN is greater than RC%d_TRIM", i + 1, i + 1); check_passed = false; } if (c->get_radio_max() < trim) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_RC, report, "RC%d_MAX is less than RC%d_TRIM", i + 1, i + 1); check_passed = false; } } return check_passed; } bool AP_Arming::rc_in_calibration_check(bool report) { if (rc().calibrating()) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_RC, report, "RC calibrating"); return false; } return true; } bool AP_Arming::manual_transmitter_checks(bool report) { if (check_enabled(ARMING_CHECK_RC)) { if (AP_Notify::flags.failsafe_radio) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_RC, report, "Radio failsafe on"); return false; } if (!rc_calibration_checks(report)) { return false; } } return rc_in_calibration_check(report); } #endif // AP_RC_CHANNEL_ENABLED #if AP_MISSION_ENABLED bool AP_Arming::mission_checks(bool report) { AP_Mission *mission = AP::mission(); if (check_enabled(ARMING_CHECK_MISSION) && _required_mission_items) { if (mission == nullptr) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_MISSION, report, "No mission library present"); return false; } const struct MisItemTable { MIS_ITEM_CHECK check; MAV_CMD mis_item_type; const char *type; } misChecks[] = { {MIS_ITEM_CHECK_LAND, MAV_CMD_NAV_LAND, "land"}, {MIS_ITEM_CHECK_VTOL_LAND, MAV_CMD_NAV_VTOL_LAND, "vtol land"}, {MIS_ITEM_CHECK_DO_LAND_START, MAV_CMD_DO_LAND_START, "do land start"}, {MIS_ITEM_CHECK_TAKEOFF, MAV_CMD_NAV_TAKEOFF, "takeoff"}, {MIS_ITEM_CHECK_VTOL_TAKEOFF, MAV_CMD_NAV_VTOL_TAKEOFF, "vtol takeoff"}, {MIS_ITEM_CHECK_RETURN_TO_LAUNCH, MAV_CMD_NAV_RETURN_TO_LAUNCH, "RTL"}, }; for (uint8_t i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(misChecks); i++) { if (_required_mission_items & misChecks[i].check) { if (!mission->contains_item(misChecks[i].mis_item_type)) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_MISSION, report, "Missing mission item: %s", misChecks[i].type); return false; } } } if (_required_mission_items & MIS_ITEM_CHECK_RALLY) { #if HAL_RALLY_ENABLED AP_Rally *rally = AP::rally(); if (rally == nullptr) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_MISSION, report, "No rally library present"); return false; } Location ahrs_loc; if (!AP::ahrs().get_location(ahrs_loc)) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_MISSION, report, "Can't check rally without position"); return false; } RallyLocation rally_loc = {}; if (!rally->find_nearest_rally_point(ahrs_loc, rally_loc)) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_MISSION, report, "No sufficiently close rally point located"); return false; } #else check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_MISSION, report, "No rally library present"); return false; #endif } } #if AP_SDCARD_STORAGE_ENABLED if (check_enabled(ARMING_CHECK_MISSION) && mission != nullptr && (mission->failed_sdcard_storage() || StorageManager::storage_failed())) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_MISSION, report, "Failed to open %s", AP_MISSION_SDCARD_FILENAME); return false; } #endif #if AP_VEHICLE_ENABLED // do not allow arming if there are no mission items and we are in // (e.g.) AUTO mode if (AP::vehicle()->current_mode_requires_mission() && (mission == nullptr || mission->num_commands() <= 1)) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_MISSION, report, "Mode requires mission"); return false; } #endif return true; } #endif // AP_MISSION_ENABLED bool AP_Arming::rangefinder_checks(bool report) { #if AP_RANGEFINDER_ENABLED if (check_enabled(ARMING_CHECK_RANGEFINDER)) { RangeFinder *range = RangeFinder::get_singleton(); if (range == nullptr) { return true; } char buffer[MAVLINK_MSG_STATUSTEXT_FIELD_TEXT_LEN+1]; if (!range->prearm_healthy(buffer, ARRAY_SIZE(buffer))) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_RANGEFINDER, report, "%s", buffer); return false; } } #endif return true; } bool AP_Arming::servo_checks(bool report) const { #if NUM_SERVO_CHANNELS bool check_passed = true; for (uint8_t i = 0; i < NUM_SERVO_CHANNELS; i++) { const SRV_Channel *c = SRV_Channels::srv_channel(i); if (c == nullptr || c->get_function() <= SRV_Channel::k_none) { continue; } const uint16_t trim = c->get_trim(); if (c->get_output_min() > trim) { check_failed(report, "SERVO%d_MIN is greater than SERVO%d_TRIM", i + 1, i + 1); check_passed = false; } if (c->get_output_max() < trim) { check_failed(report, "SERVO%d_MAX is less than SERVO%d_TRIM", i + 1, i + 1); check_passed = false; } // check functions using PWM are enabled if (SRV_Channels::get_disabled_channel_mask() & 1U<get_function(); // motors, e-stoppable functions, neopixels and ProfiLEDs may be digital outputs and thus can be disabled // scripting can use its functions as labels for LED setup const bool disabled_ok = SRV_Channel::is_motor(ch_function) || SRV_Channel::should_e_stop(ch_function) || (ch_function >= SRV_Channel::k_LED_neopixel1 && ch_function <= SRV_Channel::k_LED_neopixel4) || (ch_function >= SRV_Channel::k_ProfiLED_1 && ch_function <= SRV_Channel::k_ProfiLED_Clock) || (ch_function >= SRV_Channel::k_scripting1 && ch_function <= SRV_Channel::k_scripting16); // for all other functions raise a pre-arm failure if (!disabled_ok) { check_failed(report, "SERVO%u_FUNCTION=%u on disabled channel", i + 1, (unsigned)ch_function); check_passed = false; } } } #if HAL_WITH_IO_MCU if (!iomcu.healthy() && AP_BoardConfig::io_enabled()) { check_failed(report, "IOMCU is unhealthy"); check_passed = false; } #endif return check_passed; #else return false; #endif } bool AP_Arming::board_voltage_checks(bool report) { // check board voltage if (check_enabled(ARMING_CHECK_VOLTAGE)) { #if HAL_HAVE_BOARD_VOLTAGE const float bus_voltage = hal.analogin->board_voltage(); const float vbus_min = AP_BoardConfig::get_minimum_board_voltage(); if(((bus_voltage < vbus_min) || (bus_voltage > AP_ARMING_BOARD_VOLTAGE_MAX))) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_VOLTAGE, report, "Board (%1.1fv) out of range %1.1f-%1.1fv", (double)bus_voltage, (double)vbus_min, (double)AP_ARMING_BOARD_VOLTAGE_MAX); return false; } #endif // HAL_HAVE_BOARD_VOLTAGE #if HAL_HAVE_SERVO_VOLTAGE const float vservo_min = AP_BoardConfig::get_minimum_servo_voltage(); if (is_positive(vservo_min)) { const float servo_voltage = hal.analogin->servorail_voltage(); if (servo_voltage < vservo_min) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_VOLTAGE, report, "Servo voltage to low (%1.2fv < %1.2fv)", (double)servo_voltage, (double)vservo_min); return false; } } #endif // HAL_HAVE_SERVO_VOLTAGE } return true; } #if HAL_HAVE_IMU_HEATER bool AP_Arming::heater_min_temperature_checks(bool report) { if (checks_to_perform & ARMING_CHECK_ALL) { AP_BoardConfig *board = AP::boardConfig(); if (board) { float temperature; int8_t min_temperature; if (board->get_board_heater_temperature(temperature) && board->get_board_heater_arming_temperature(min_temperature) && (temperature < min_temperature)) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_SYSTEM, report, "heater temp low (%0.1f < %i)", temperature, min_temperature); return false; } } } return true; } #endif // HAL_HAVE_IMU_HEATER /* check base system operations */ bool AP_Arming::system_checks(bool report) { char buffer[MAVLINK_MSG_STATUSTEXT_FIELD_TEXT_LEN+1] {}; if (check_enabled(ARMING_CHECK_SYSTEM)) { if (!hal.storage->healthy()) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_SYSTEM, report, "Param storage failed"); return false; } if (AP_Param::get_eeprom_full()) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_PARAMETERS, report, "parameter storage full"); return false; } // check main loop rate is at least 90% of expected value const float actual_loop_rate = AP::scheduler().get_filtered_loop_rate_hz(); const uint16_t expected_loop_rate = AP::scheduler().get_loop_rate_hz(); const float loop_rate_pct = actual_loop_rate / expected_loop_rate; if (loop_rate_pct < 0.90) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_SYSTEM, report, "Main loop slow (%uHz < %uHz)", (unsigned)actual_loop_rate, (unsigned)expected_loop_rate); return false; } #if AP_TERRAIN_AVAILABLE const AP_Terrain *terrain = AP_Terrain::get_singleton(); if ((terrain != nullptr) && terrain->init_failed()) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_SYSTEM, report, "Terrain out of memory"); return false; } #endif #if AP_SCRIPTING_ENABLED const AP_Scripting *scripting = AP_Scripting::get_singleton(); if ((scripting != nullptr) && !scripting->arming_checks(sizeof(buffer), buffer)) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_SYSTEM, report, "%s", buffer); return false; } #endif #if HAL_ADSB_ENABLED AP_ADSB *adsb = AP::ADSB(); if ((adsb != nullptr) && adsb->enabled() && adsb->init_failed()) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_SYSTEM, report, "ADSB out of memory"); return false; } #endif } if (AP::internalerror().errors() != 0) { AP::internalerror().errors_as_string((uint8_t*)buffer, ARRAY_SIZE(buffer)); check_failed(report, "Internal errors 0x%x l:%u %s", (unsigned int)AP::internalerror().errors(), AP::internalerror().last_error_line(), buffer); return false; } if (!hal.gpio->arming_checks(sizeof(buffer), buffer)) { check_failed(report, "%s", buffer); return false; } if (check_enabled(ARMING_CHECK_PARAMETERS)) { #if !AP_GPS_BLENDED_ENABLED if (!blending_auto_switch_checks(report)) { return false; } #endif #if AP_RPM_ENABLED auto *rpm = AP::rpm(); if (rpm && !rpm->arming_checks(sizeof(buffer), buffer)) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_PARAMETERS, report, "%s", buffer); return false; } #endif #if AP_RELAY_ENABLED auto *relay = AP::relay(); if (relay && !relay->arming_checks(sizeof(buffer), buffer)) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_PARAMETERS, report, "%s", buffer); return false; } #endif #if HAL_PARACHUTE_ENABLED auto *chute = AP::parachute(); if (chute && !chute->arming_checks(sizeof(buffer), buffer)) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_PARAMETERS, report, "%s", buffer); return false; } #endif #if HAL_BUTTON_ENABLED const auto &button = AP::button(); if (!button.arming_checks(sizeof(buffer), buffer)) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_PARAMETERS, report, "%s", buffer); return false; } #endif } return true; } bool AP_Arming::terrain_database_required() const { #if AP_MISSION_ENABLED AP_Mission *mission = AP::mission(); if (mission == nullptr) { // no mission support? return false; } if (mission->contains_terrain_alt_items()) { return true; } #endif return false; } // check terrain database is fit-for-purpose bool AP_Arming::terrain_checks(bool report) const { if (!check_enabled(ARMING_CHECK_PARAMETERS)) { return true; } if (!terrain_database_required()) { return true; } #if AP_TERRAIN_AVAILABLE const AP_Terrain *terrain = AP_Terrain::get_singleton(); if (terrain == nullptr) { // this is also a system error, and it is already complaining // about it. return false; } if (!terrain->enabled()) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_PARAMETERS, report, "terrain disabled"); return false; } char fail_msg[MAVLINK_MSG_STATUSTEXT_FIELD_TEXT_LEN+1]; if (!terrain->pre_arm_checks(fail_msg, sizeof(fail_msg))) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_PARAMETERS, report, "%s", fail_msg); return false; } return true; #else check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_PARAMETERS, report, "terrain required but disabled"); return false; #endif } #if HAL_PROXIMITY_ENABLED // check nothing is too close to vehicle bool AP_Arming::proximity_checks(bool report) const { const AP_Proximity *proximity = AP::proximity(); // return true immediately if no sensor present if (proximity == nullptr) { return true; } char buffer[MAVLINK_MSG_STATUSTEXT_FIELD_TEXT_LEN+1]; if (!proximity->prearm_healthy(buffer, ARRAY_SIZE(buffer))) { check_failed(report, "%s", buffer); return false; } return true; } #endif // HAL_PROXIMITY_ENABLED #if HAL_MAX_CAN_PROTOCOL_DRIVERS && HAL_CANMANAGER_ENABLED bool AP_Arming::can_checks(bool report) { if (check_enabled(ARMING_CHECK_SYSTEM)) { char fail_msg[50] = {}; (void)fail_msg; // might be left unused uint8_t num_drivers = AP::can().get_num_drivers(); for (uint8_t i = 0; i < num_drivers; i++) { switch (AP::can().get_driver_type(i)) { case AP_CAN::Protocol::PiccoloCAN: { #if HAL_PICCOLO_CAN_ENABLE AP_PiccoloCAN *ap_pcan = AP_PiccoloCAN::get_pcan(i); if (ap_pcan != nullptr && !ap_pcan->pre_arm_check(fail_msg, ARRAY_SIZE(fail_msg))) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_SYSTEM, report, "PiccoloCAN: %s", fail_msg); return false; } #else check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_SYSTEM, report, "PiccoloCAN not enabled"); return false; #endif break; } case AP_CAN::Protocol::DroneCAN: { #if HAL_ENABLE_DRONECAN_DRIVERS AP_DroneCAN *ap_dronecan = AP_DroneCAN::get_dronecan(i); if (ap_dronecan != nullptr && !ap_dronecan->prearm_check(fail_msg, ARRAY_SIZE(fail_msg))) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_SYSTEM, report, "DroneCAN: %s", fail_msg); return false; } #endif break; } case AP_CAN::Protocol::USD1: case AP_CAN::Protocol::TOFSenseP: case AP_CAN::Protocol::NanoRadar: case AP_CAN::Protocol::Benewake: { for (uint8_t j = i; j; j--) { if (AP::can().get_driver_type(i) == AP::can().get_driver_type(j-1)) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_SYSTEM, report, "Same rfnd on different CAN ports"); return false; } } break; } case AP_CAN::Protocol::EFI_NWPMU: case AP_CAN::Protocol::None: case AP_CAN::Protocol::Scripting: case AP_CAN::Protocol::Scripting2: case AP_CAN::Protocol::KDECAN: break; } } } return true; } #endif // HAL_MAX_CAN_PROTOCOL_DRIVERS && HAL_CANMANAGER_ENABLED #if AP_FENCE_ENABLED bool AP_Arming::fence_checks(bool display_failure) { const AC_Fence *fence = AP::fence(); if (fence == nullptr) { return true; } // check fence is ready const char *fail_msg = nullptr; if (fence->pre_arm_check(fail_msg)) { return true; } if (fail_msg == nullptr) { check_failed(display_failure, "Check fence"); } else { check_failed(display_failure, "%s", fail_msg); } #if AP_SDCARD_STORAGE_ENABLED if (fence->failed_sdcard_storage() || StorageManager::storage_failed()) { check_failed(display_failure, "Failed to open fence storage"); return false; } #endif return false; } #endif // AP_FENCE_ENABLED #if HAL_RUNCAM_ENABLED bool AP_Arming::camera_checks(bool display_failure) { if (check_enabled(ARMING_CHECK_CAMERA)) { AP_RunCam *runcam = AP::runcam(); if (runcam == nullptr) { return true; } // check camera is ready char fail_msg[MAVLINK_MSG_STATUSTEXT_FIELD_TEXT_LEN+1]; if (!runcam->pre_arm_check(fail_msg, ARRAY_SIZE(fail_msg))) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_CAMERA, display_failure, "%s", fail_msg); return false; } } return true; } #endif // HAL_RUNCAM_ENABLED #if OSD_ENABLED bool AP_Arming::osd_checks(bool display_failure) const { if (check_enabled(ARMING_CHECK_OSD)) { // if no OSD then pass const AP_OSD *osd = AP::osd(); if (osd == nullptr) { return true; } // do osd checks for configuration char fail_msg[MAVLINK_MSG_STATUSTEXT_FIELD_TEXT_LEN+1]; if (!osd->pre_arm_check(fail_msg, ARRAY_SIZE(fail_msg))) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_OSD, display_failure, "%s", fail_msg); return false; } } return true; } #endif // OSD_ENABLED #if HAL_MOUNT_ENABLED bool AP_Arming::mount_checks(bool display_failure) const { if (check_enabled(ARMING_CHECK_CAMERA)) { AP_Mount *mount = AP::mount(); if (mount == nullptr) { return true; } char fail_msg[MAVLINK_MSG_STATUSTEXT_FIELD_TEXT_LEN+1] = {}; if (!mount->pre_arm_checks(fail_msg, sizeof(fail_msg))) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_CAMERA, display_failure, "Mount: %s", fail_msg); return false; } } return true; } #endif // HAL_MOUNT_ENABLED #if AP_FETTEC_ONEWIRE_ENABLED bool AP_Arming::fettec_checks(bool display_failure) const { const AP_FETtecOneWire *f = AP_FETtecOneWire::get_singleton(); if (f == nullptr) { return true; } // check ESCs are ready char fail_msg[MAVLINK_MSG_STATUSTEXT_FIELD_TEXT_LEN+1]; if (!f->pre_arm_check(fail_msg, ARRAY_SIZE(fail_msg))) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_ALL, display_failure, "FETtec: %s", fail_msg); return false; } return true; } #endif // AP_FETTEC_ONEWIRE_ENABLED #if AP_ARMING_AUX_AUTH_ENABLED // request an auxiliary authorisation id. This id should be used in subsequent calls to set_aux_auth_passed/failed // returns true on success bool AP_Arming::get_aux_auth_id(uint8_t& auth_id) { WITH_SEMAPHORE(aux_auth_sem); // check we have enough room to allocate another id if (aux_auth_count >= aux_auth_count_max) { aux_auth_error = true; return false; } // allocate buffer for failure message if (aux_auth_fail_msg == nullptr) { aux_auth_fail_msg = (char *)calloc(aux_auth_str_len, sizeof(char)); if (aux_auth_fail_msg == nullptr) { aux_auth_error = true; return false; } } auth_id = aux_auth_count; aux_auth_count++; return true; } // set auxiliary authorisation passed void AP_Arming::set_aux_auth_passed(uint8_t auth_id) { WITH_SEMAPHORE(aux_auth_sem); // sanity check auth_id if (auth_id >= aux_auth_count) { return; } aux_auth_state[auth_id] = AuxAuthStates::AUTH_PASSED; } // set auxiliary authorisation failed and provide failure message void AP_Arming::set_aux_auth_failed(uint8_t auth_id, const char* fail_msg) { WITH_SEMAPHORE(aux_auth_sem); // sanity check auth_id if (auth_id >= aux_auth_count) { return; } // update state aux_auth_state[auth_id] = AuxAuthStates::AUTH_FAILED; // store failure message if this authoriser has the lowest auth_id for (uint8_t i = 0; i < auth_id; i++) { if (aux_auth_state[i] == AuxAuthStates::AUTH_FAILED) { return; } } if (aux_auth_fail_msg != nullptr) { if (fail_msg == nullptr) { strncpy(aux_auth_fail_msg, "Auxiliary authorisation refused", aux_auth_str_len); } else { strncpy(aux_auth_fail_msg, fail_msg, aux_auth_str_len); } aux_auth_fail_msg_source = auth_id; } } bool AP_Arming::aux_auth_checks(bool display_failure) { // handle error cases if (aux_auth_error) { if (aux_auth_fail_msg == nullptr) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_AUX_AUTH, display_failure, "memory low for auxiliary authorisation"); } else { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_AUX_AUTH, display_failure, "Too many auxiliary authorisers"); } return false; } WITH_SEMAPHORE(aux_auth_sem); // check results for each auxiliary authorisation id bool some_failures = false; bool failure_msg_sent = false; bool waiting_for_responses = false; for (uint8_t i = 0; i < aux_auth_count; i++) { switch (aux_auth_state[i]) { case AuxAuthStates::NO_RESPONSE: waiting_for_responses = true; break; case AuxAuthStates::AUTH_FAILED: some_failures = true; if (i == aux_auth_fail_msg_source) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_AUX_AUTH, display_failure, "%s", aux_auth_fail_msg); failure_msg_sent = true; } break; case AuxAuthStates::AUTH_PASSED: break; } } // send failure or waiting message if (some_failures) { if (!failure_msg_sent) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_AUX_AUTH, display_failure, "Auxiliary authorisation refused"); } return false; } else if (waiting_for_responses) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_AUX_AUTH, display_failure, "Waiting for auxiliary authorisation"); return false; } // if we got this far all auxiliary checks must have passed return true; } #endif // AP_ARMING_AUX_AUTH_ENABLED #if HAL_GENERATOR_ENABLED bool AP_Arming::generator_checks(bool display_failure) const { const AP_Generator *generator = AP::generator(); if (generator == nullptr) { return true; } char failure_msg[50] = {}; if (!generator->pre_arm_check(failure_msg, sizeof(failure_msg))) { check_failed(display_failure, "Generator: %s", failure_msg); return false; } return true; } #endif // HAL_GENERATOR_ENABLED #if AP_OPENDRONEID_ENABLED // OpenDroneID Checks bool AP_Arming::opendroneid_checks(bool display_failure) { auto &opendroneid = AP::opendroneid(); char failure_msg[50] {}; if (!opendroneid.pre_arm_check(failure_msg, sizeof(failure_msg))) { check_failed(display_failure, "OpenDroneID: %s", failure_msg); return false; } return true; } #endif // AP_OPENDRONEID_ENABLED //Check for multiple RC in serial protocols bool AP_Arming::serial_protocol_checks(bool display_failure) { if (AP::serialmanager().have_serial(AP_SerialManager::SerialProtocol_RCIN, 1)) { check_failed(display_failure, "Multiple SERIAL ports configured for RC input"); return false; } return true; } //Check for estop bool AP_Arming::estop_checks(bool display_failure) { if (!SRV_Channels::get_emergency_stop()) { // not emergency-stopped, so no prearm failure: return true; } #if AP_RC_CHANNEL_ENABLED // vehicle is emergency-stopped; if this *appears* to have been done via switch then we do not fail prearms: const RC_Channel *chan = rc().find_channel_for_option(RC_Channel::AUX_FUNC::ARM_EMERGENCY_STOP); if (chan != nullptr) { // an RC channel is configured for arm_emergency_stop option, so estop maybe activated via this switch if (chan->get_aux_switch_pos() == RC_Channel::AuxSwitchPos::LOW) { // switch is configured and is in estop position, so likely the reason we are estopped, so no prearm failure return true; // no prearm failure } } #endif // AP_RC_CHANNEL_ENABLED check_failed(display_failure,"Motors Emergency Stopped"); return false; } bool AP_Arming::pre_arm_checks(bool report) { #if !APM_BUILD_COPTER_OR_HELI if (armed || arming_required() == Required::NO) { // if we are already armed or don't need any arming checks // then skip the checks return true; } #endif bool checks_result = hardware_safety_check(report) #if HAL_HAVE_IMU_HEATER & heater_min_temperature_checks(report) #endif #if AP_BARO_ENABLED & barometer_checks(report) #endif #if AP_INERTIALSENSOR_ENABLED & ins_checks(report) #endif #if AP_COMPASS_ENABLED & compass_checks(report) #endif #if AP_GPS_ENABLED & gps_checks(report) #endif #if AP_BATTERY_ENABLED & battery_checks(report) #endif #if HAL_LOGGING_ENABLED & logging_checks(report) #endif #if AP_RC_CHANNEL_ENABLED & manual_transmitter_checks(report) #endif #if AP_MISSION_ENABLED & mission_checks(report) #endif #if AP_RANGEFINDER_ENABLED & rangefinder_checks(report) #endif & servo_checks(report) & board_voltage_checks(report) & system_checks(report) & terrain_checks(report) #if HAL_MAX_CAN_PROTOCOL_DRIVERS && HAL_CANMANAGER_ENABLED & can_checks(report) #endif #if HAL_GENERATOR_ENABLED & generator_checks(report) #endif #if HAL_PROXIMITY_ENABLED & proximity_checks(report) #endif #if HAL_RUNCAM_ENABLED & camera_checks(report) #endif #if OSD_ENABLED & osd_checks(report) #endif #if HAL_MOUNT_ENABLED & mount_checks(report) #endif #if AP_FETTEC_ONEWIRE_ENABLED & fettec_checks(report) #endif #if HAL_VISUALODOM_ENABLED & visodom_checks(report) #endif #if AP_ARMING_AUX_AUTH_ENABLED & aux_auth_checks(report) #endif #if AP_RC_CHANNEL_ENABLED & disarm_switch_checks(report) #endif #if AP_FENCE_ENABLED & fence_checks(report) #endif #if AP_OPENDRONEID_ENABLED & opendroneid_checks(report) #endif #if AP_ARMING_CRASHDUMP_ACK_ENABLED & crashdump_checks(report) #endif & serial_protocol_checks(report) & estop_checks(report); if (!checks_result && last_prearm_checks_result) { // check went from true to false report_immediately = true; } last_prearm_checks_result = checks_result; return checks_result; } bool AP_Arming::arm_checks(AP_Arming::Method method) { #if AP_RC_CHANNEL_ENABLED if (check_enabled(ARMING_CHECK_RC)) { if (!rc_arm_checks(method)) { return false; } } #endif // ensure the GPS drivers are ready on any final changes if (check_enabled(ARMING_CHECK_GPS_CONFIG)) { if (!AP::gps().prepare_for_arming()) { return false; } } // note that this will prepare AP_Logger to start logging // so should be the last check to be done before arming // Note also that we need to PrepForArming() regardless of whether // the arming check flag is set - disabling the arming check // should not stop logging from working. #if HAL_LOGGING_ENABLED AP_Logger *logger = AP_Logger::get_singleton(); if (logger->logging_present()) { // If we're configured to log, prep it logger->PrepForArming(); if (!logger->logging_started() && check_enabled(ARMING_CHECK_LOGGING)) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_LOGGING, true, "Logging not started"); return false; } } #endif // HAL_LOGGING_ENABLED return true; } #if !AP_GPS_BLENDED_ENABLED bool AP_Arming::blending_auto_switch_checks(bool report) { if (AP::gps().get_auto_switch_type() == 2) { if (report) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_GPS, true, "GPS_AUTO_SWITCH==2 but no blending"); } return false; } return true; } #endif #if AP_ARMING_CRASHDUMP_ACK_ENABLED bool AP_Arming::crashdump_checks(bool report) { if (hal.util->last_crash_dump_size() == 0) { // no crash dump data return true; } // see if the user has acknowledged the failure and wants to fly anyway: if (crashdump_ack.acked) { // they may have acked the problem, that doesn't mean we don't // continue to warn them they're on thin ice: if (report) { GCS_SEND_TEXT(MAV_SEVERITY_WARNING, "CrashDump data detected"); } return true; } check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_PARAMETERS, true, "CrashDump data detected"); return false; } #endif // AP_ARMING_CRASHDUMP_ACK_ENABLED bool AP_Arming::mandatory_checks(bool report) { bool ret = true; #if AP_OPENDRONEID_ENABLED ret &= opendroneid_checks(report); #endif ret &= rc_in_calibration_check(report); ret &= serial_protocol_checks(report); return ret; } //returns true if arming occurred successfully bool AP_Arming::arm(AP_Arming::Method method, const bool do_arming_checks) { if (armed) { //already armed return false; } running_arming_checks = true; // so we show Arm: rather than Disarm: in messages if ((!do_arming_checks && mandatory_checks(true)) || (pre_arm_checks(true) && arm_checks(method))) { armed = true; _last_arm_method = method; #if HAL_LOGGING_ENABLED Log_Write_Arm(!do_arming_checks, method); // note Log_Write_Armed takes forced not do_arming_checks #endif } else { #if HAL_LOGGING_ENABLED AP::logger().arming_failure(); #endif armed = false; } running_arming_checks = false; if (armed && do_arming_checks && checks_to_perform == 0) { GCS_SEND_TEXT(MAV_SEVERITY_WARNING, "Warning: Arming Checks Disabled"); } #if HAL_GYROFFT_ENABLED // make sure the FFT subsystem is enabled if arming checks have been disabled AP_GyroFFT *fft = AP::fft(); if (fft != nullptr) { fft->prepare_for_arming(); } #endif #if AP_TERRAIN_AVAILABLE if (armed) { // tell terrain we have just armed, so it can setup // a reference location for terrain adjustment auto *terrain = AP::terrain(); if (terrain != nullptr) { terrain->set_reference_location(); } } #endif #if AP_FENCE_ENABLED if (armed) { auto *fence = AP::fence(); if (fence != nullptr) { // If a fence is set to auto-enable, turn on the fence if (fence->auto_enabled() == AC_Fence::AutoEnable::ONLY_WHEN_ARMED) { fence->enable(true); GCS_SEND_TEXT(MAV_SEVERITY_INFO, "Fence: auto-enabled"); } } } #endif #if defined(HAL_ARM_GPIO_PIN) update_arm_gpio(); #endif return armed; } //returns true if disarming occurred successfully bool AP_Arming::disarm(const AP_Arming::Method method, bool do_disarm_checks) { if (!armed) { // already disarmed return false; } armed = false; _last_disarm_method = method; #if HAL_LOGGING_ENABLED Log_Write_Disarm(!do_disarm_checks, method); // Log_Write_Disarm takes "force" check_forced_logging(method); #endif #if HAL_HAVE_SAFETY_SWITCH AP_BoardConfig *board_cfg = AP_BoardConfig::get_singleton(); if ((board_cfg != nullptr) && (board_cfg->get_safety_button_options() & AP_BoardConfig::BOARD_SAFETY_OPTION_SAFETY_ON_DISARM)) { hal.rcout->force_safety_on(); } #endif // HAL_HAVE_SAFETY_SWITCH #if HAL_GYROFFT_ENABLED AP_GyroFFT *fft = AP::fft(); if (fft != nullptr) { fft->save_params_on_disarm(); } #endif #if AP_FENCE_ENABLED AC_Fence *fence = AP::fence(); if (fence != nullptr) { if(fence->auto_enabled() == AC_Fence::AutoEnable::ONLY_WHEN_ARMED) { fence->enable(false); } } #endif #if defined(HAL_ARM_GPIO_PIN) update_arm_gpio(); #endif return true; } #if defined(HAL_ARM_GPIO_PIN) void AP_Arming::update_arm_gpio() { if (!AP_BoardConfig::arming_gpio_disabled()) { hal.gpio->write(HAL_ARM_GPIO_PIN, HAL_ARM_GPIO_POL_INVERT ? !armed : armed); } } #endif void AP_Arming::send_arm_disarm_statustext(const char *str) const { if (option_enabled(AP_Arming::Option::DISABLE_STATUSTEXT_ON_STATE_CHANGE)) { return; } GCS_SEND_TEXT(MAV_SEVERITY_INFO, "%s", str); } AP_Arming::Required AP_Arming::arming_required() const { #if AP_OPENDRONEID_ENABLED // cannot be disabled if OpenDroneID is present if (AP_OpenDroneID::get_singleton() != nullptr && AP::opendroneid().enabled()) { if (require != Required::YES_MIN_PWM && require != Required::YES_ZERO_PWM) { return Required::YES_MIN_PWM; } } #endif return require; } #if AP_RC_CHANNEL_ENABLED // Copter and sub share the same RC input limits // Copter checks that min and max have been configured by default, Sub does not bool AP_Arming::rc_checks_copter_sub(const bool display_failure, const RC_Channel *channels[4]) const { // set rc-checks to success if RC checks are disabled if (!check_enabled(ARMING_CHECK_RC)) { return true; } bool ret = true; const char *channel_names[] = { "Roll", "Pitch", "Throttle", "Yaw" }; for (uint8_t i=0; iget_radio_min() > RC_Channel::RC_CALIB_MIN_LIMIT_PWM) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_RC, display_failure, "%s radio min too high", channel_name); ret = false; } if (channel->get_radio_max() < RC_Channel::RC_CALIB_MAX_LIMIT_PWM) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_RC, display_failure, "%s radio max too low", channel_name); ret = false; } } return ret; } #endif // AP_RC_CHANNEL_ENABLED #if HAL_VISUALODOM_ENABLED // check visual odometry is working bool AP_Arming::visodom_checks(bool display_failure) const { if (!check_enabled(ARMING_CHECK_VISION)) { return true; } AP_VisualOdom *visual_odom = AP::visualodom(); if (visual_odom != nullptr) { char fail_msg[MAVLINK_MSG_STATUSTEXT_FIELD_TEXT_LEN+1]; if (!visual_odom->pre_arm_check(fail_msg, ARRAY_SIZE(fail_msg))) { check_failed(ARMING_CHECK_VISION, display_failure, "VisOdom: %s", fail_msg); return false; } } return true; } #endif #if AP_RC_CHANNEL_ENABLED // check disarm switch is asserted bool AP_Arming::disarm_switch_checks(bool display_failure) const { const RC_Channel *chan = rc().find_channel_for_option(RC_Channel::AUX_FUNC::DISARM); if (chan != nullptr && chan->get_aux_switch_pos() == RC_Channel::AuxSwitchPos::HIGH) { check_failed(display_failure, "Disarm Switch on"); return false; } return true; } #endif // AP_RC_CHANNEL_ENABLED #if HAL_LOGGING_ENABLED void AP_Arming::Log_Write_Arm(const bool forced, const AP_Arming::Method method) { const struct log_Arm_Disarm pkt { LOG_PACKET_HEADER_INIT(LOG_ARM_DISARM_MSG), time_us : AP_HAL::micros64(), arm_state : is_armed(), arm_checks : get_enabled_checks(), forced : forced, method : (uint8_t)method, }; AP::logger().WriteCriticalBlock(&pkt, sizeof(pkt)); AP::logger().Write_Event(LogEvent::ARMED); } void AP_Arming::Log_Write_Disarm(const bool forced, const AP_Arming::Method method) { const struct log_Arm_Disarm pkt { LOG_PACKET_HEADER_INIT(LOG_ARM_DISARM_MSG), time_us : AP_HAL::micros64(), arm_state : is_armed(), arm_checks : 0, forced : forced, method : (uint8_t)method }; AP::logger().WriteCriticalBlock(&pkt, sizeof(pkt)); AP::logger().Write_Event(LogEvent::DISARMED); } // check if we should keep logging after disarming void AP_Arming::check_forced_logging(const AP_Arming::Method method) { // keep logging if disarmed for a bad reason switch(method) { case Method::TERMINATION: case Method::CPUFAILSAFE: case Method::BATTERYFAILSAFE: case Method::AFS: case Method::ADSBCOLLISIONACTION: case Method::PARACHUTE_RELEASE: case Method::CRASH: case Method::FENCEBREACH: case Method::RADIOFAILSAFE: case Method::GCSFAILSAFE: case Method::TERRRAINFAILSAFE: case Method::FAILSAFE_ACTION_TERMINATE: case Method::TERRAINFAILSAFE: case Method::BADFLOWOFCONTROL: case Method::EKFFAILSAFE: case Method::GCS_FAILSAFE_SURFACEFAILED: case Method::GCS_FAILSAFE_HOLDFAILED: case Method::PILOT_INPUT_FAILSAFE: case Method::DEADRECKON_FAILSAFE: case Method::BLACKBOX: // keep logging for longer if disarmed for a bad reason AP::logger().set_long_log_persist(true); return; case Method::RUDDER: case Method::MAVLINK: case Method::AUXSWITCH: case Method::MOTORTEST: case Method::SCRIPTING: case Method::SOLOPAUSEWHENLANDED: case Method::LANDED: case Method::MISSIONEXIT: case Method::DISARMDELAY: case Method::MOTORDETECTDONE: case Method::TAKEOFFTIMEOUT: case Method::AUTOLANDED: case Method::TOYMODELANDTHROTTLE: case Method::TOYMODELANDFORCE: case Method::LANDING: case Method::DDS: case Method::UNKNOWN: AP::logger().set_long_log_persist(false); return; } } #endif // HAL_LOGGING_ENABLED AP_Arming *AP_Arming::_singleton = nullptr; /* * Get the AP_Arming singleton */ AP_Arming *AP_Arming::get_singleton() { return AP_Arming::_singleton; } namespace AP { AP_Arming &arming() { return *AP_Arming::get_singleton(); } }; #pragma GCC diagnostic pop #endif // AP_ARMING_ENABLED